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“[A] constitution . . . is made for people of fundamentally differing views . . . .”
– Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1
INTRODUCTION
In the ongoing culture wars, few battlegrounds are more contested than freedom of expression. In recent decades, the First
Amendment has been at the heart of controversies over antiwar
demonstrations,2 pornography,3 hate speech,4 flag burning,5 abortion
counseling,6 anti-abortion protests,7 and the National Endowment for
1. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding conviction for draft
card burning).
3. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that regulation of indecency on
Internet violates First Amendment); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding child
pornography unprotected by First Amendment); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973) (reaffirming state power to regulate obscenity); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(same); Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (invalidating antipornography ordinance), aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
4. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 71 U.S.L.W. 4263 (2003) (upholding prohibition on cross
burning with intent to intimidate); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating
ban on display of racist symbols); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that
First Amendment protects neo-Nazi demonstration).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (reversing flag-burning
conviction under First Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (same).
6. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding denial of funding to family
planning programs that provide abortion counseling).
7. See, e.g., Scheidler v. Nat’l. Org. for Women, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1057 (2003) (denying civil
RICO action for conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000)
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the Arts.8 On issues of this sort, liberals, conservatives, and progressives have often found themselves divided against one another, and
even among themselves.
Amid all this controversy, there is a strong temptation to appeal
to an idealized version of the First Amendment—one with a clear
meaning that stands above cultural conflict. No part of the political
spectrum has been immune from this temptation. Some conservatives
are inclined to look for a clear meaning in the original understanding
of the First Amendment.9 Although liberals generally reject originalism, they often employ such rhetoric in free speech cases, or invoke
the plain language of the First Amendment.10 Other liberals rely
upon political and moral theory to construct an ideal First Amendment, such as one based on notions of individual liberty or autonomy.11 Even radical critics sometimes see the First Amendment as
having a clear meaning—for example, as embodying a liberal view
that must be criticized or rejected.12
As I shall show, however, ideological conflict is inevitable in the
First Amendment area. This is not merely because free speech issues
tend to stir strong passions. Instead, it results from the very nature of
the First Amendment. As Part I demonstrates, the Bill of Rights was
adopted against the background of sharp controversy over the new
Federal Constitution. The Bill of Rights was intended not only to
provide additional safeguards for liberty, but also to promote national
unity by accommodating some of the major concerns of those who
had opposed the Constitution. As the framers recognized, however,
the adoption of a bill of rights would itself require a consensus.
Moreover, civil liberties issues were no less controversial during the
founding period than they are today. For these reasons, the Bill of
(upholding regulation of speech near abortion clinic); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.
N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (partially invalidating injunction restricting speech near abortion
clinic); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding ban on targeted residential picketing).
8. See NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (holding that NEA may consider standards of
decency in awarding arts funding).
9. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 359 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“When interpreting the Free Speech and Press Clauses, we must be guided by their
original meaning, for ‘the Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not
alter. That which it meant when adopted, it means now.’”) (quoting South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905)).
10. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 295–97 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157–58 (1959) (Black, J., concurring).
11. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989);
MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1984).
12. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 207 (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED].
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Rights was drafted in the form of general principles that could
command broad support, while avoiding particular issues that might
prove divisive. But such consensus was possible only on the level of
general principles. When it came time to apply these principles to
concrete situations, differences of opinion were bound to emerge.
Thus, the First Amendment and the Bill of Rights have always been
subject to competing interpretations—interpretations that are rooted
in differing political, social, and cultural views.
It follows that the meaning of the First Amendment can never be
wholly removed from ideological conflict. But such conflict should
not be unbounded. Instead, a central task of constitutional jurisprudence is to develop a common language or framework within which
to debate controversial issues. In Part II, I argue that such a framework can be found in a rights-based theory of the First Amendment.
On this view, First Amendment problems should not be seen as
conflicts between the right to free speech and other, incommensurable values. When understood in this way, such problems may well
appear to involve intractable conflicts between opposing ideological
positions. Instead, many First Amendment problems should be
understood as conflicts between free speech and other rights—rights
that are rooted in the same values as free speech itself. In this way, it
may be possible to develop some common ground in debates over the
First Amendment, or at least to develop a common language within
which those debates can take place.
In the remainder of the Essay, I explore how this rights-based
approach would apply to the classic cultural conflict in this area—the
problem of pornography. After reviewing the debate between
conservatives, liberals, feminists, and others, I argue that pornography falls within the general right to freedom of speech. The question
then becomes whether pornography violates the rights of others. In
Part III, I discuss the radical feminist position that pornography may
be regulated to prevent harm to women. In Part IV, I address conservative concerns about pornography and its impact on the community.
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IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE
FOUNDING PERIOD
A. The Madisonian Theory of Conflict

At the time of the founding, no one had thought more deeply
about the problem of political, social, and cultural conflict than James
Madison. For Madison, such conflict posed the central problem for
American constitutionalism—a theme that he developed in The
Federalist No. 10 and other writings and speeches.13
Common theories of democracy or republicanism, Madison observed, were founded “on the idea, that the people composing the
Society enjoy not only an equality of political rights; but that they
have all precisely the same interests and the same feelings in every
respect.”14 But it was clear that “no Society ever did or can consist of
so homogeneous a mass of Citizens.”15 Instead, societies were inevitably divided into distinct groups and interests.16 These divisions gave
rise to what Madison called the problem of “faction,” which he
defined as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or
a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”17
According to Madison, “the most common and durable source of
factions has been the verious [sic] and unequal distribution of property.”18 Divisions between rich and poor existed in every society. In
modern nations, further distinctions arose from the different forms of
economic activity: “A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a
mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, [and] many lesser interests.”19
13. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in JAMES
MADISON: WRITINGS 69, 76–80 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999); James Madison, Madison’s Notes
(June 6, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1937); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24 & Nov. 1, 1787), in 1 THE
REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES
MADISON 1776–1826, at 500–02 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995) [hereinafter Letter from
Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787)]; THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
14. Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), supra note 13, at 500–01.
15. Id. at 501.
16. See id.
17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 13, at 78 (James Madison).
18. Id. at 79.
19. Id.
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In addition to conflicting interests, faction also arose from differences of opinion. Of course, such differences were inevitable: they
would arise “[a]s long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he
is at liberty to exercise it.”20 The difficulty was that human beings
tended to be passionately attached to their own views.21 This led to
divisions based on a “zeal for different opinions concerning religion,
concerning government, and many other points,” as well as “an
attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for preeminence and power.”22 In Madison’s view, such ideological divisions
were particularly dangerous, because of their tendency to “divide[]
mankind into parties, inflame[] them with mutual animosity, and
render[] them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other
than to co-operate for their common good.”23 Economic differences
also engendered ideological disagreement, especially over such issues
as the distribution of property and the rights of creditors and debtors.24
The proposal in The Federalist No. 10 for combating faction is
well known. According to Madison, the effects of faction could best
be controlled within a large society such as the Union, rather than
smaller societies like the States.25 The smaller the society, the more
likely it was that particular factions would form a majority that would
be able and willing to oppress the minority.26 “Extend the sphere, and
you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens,” or will have the capacity to do
so.27 An extended republic had another advantage as well, Madison
argued. Large electoral districts were more likely to return representatives “whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely
to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”28 Representa-

20. Id. at 78.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 79.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 79–80 (observing that the influence of economic distinctions “on the
sentiments and views of the respective proprietors” leads to “a division of the society into
different interests and parties”).
25. Id. at 83–84.
26. Id. at 83.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 82–83.
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tives of this sort would be in the best position “to adjust these clashing interests and render them all subservient to the public good.”29
It was these views that led Madison to promote a new constitution to establish a stronger federal government. His views played an
important part both in the Constitutional Convention and in explaining the proposed Constitution to those who would ratify it. For these
reasons, it is reasonable to conclude that the Constitution at least
partly follows the approach to political, social, and economic conflict
that Madison advocated. Instead of denying or suppressing such
conflict, the Constitution recognizes that it is inevitable, but seeks to
control and channel it. This is particularly true of the legislative
process. As Madison observed, “[t]he regulation of these various and
interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation
and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and
ordinary operations of government.”30
B.

The Bill of Rights

Madison’s argument in The Federalist No. 10 was concerned with
how a constitution, once adopted, could control the effects of faction
in the operations of government and the ordinary political process.
As Madison discovered, however, the same divisions over interest
and ideology had an impact on the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution itself.31 This was true of the conflicts in the Constitutional Convention between the large states and small states over
representation,32 and between the northern states and southern states
over slavery.33 It was true of debates over the division of powers
29. Id. at 80.
30. Id. at 79.
31. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 13, at 230 (James Madison) (observing that
“although this variety of interests . . . may have a salutary influence on the administration of the
government when formed, yet every one must be sensible of the contrary influence which must
have been experienced in the task of forming it”).
32. Delegates from the large states, such as Madison of Virginia and James Wilson of
Pennsylvania, strongly opposed the small states’ demands for equal representation in the
Congress, not only in the interests of their own states but also on grounds of principle—the
belief that representation should be based on population. The small states refused to budge,
however, and the large states ultimately were forced to agree to the compromise that granted
each state an equal representation in the Senate but a proportional representation in the House.
For an account of the debates over representation, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS ch. 4 (1996).
33. Delegates from some of the southern states insisted that slaves should be fully counted
for purposes of representation in the national legislature. Resisting these demands, northern
delegates argued that if slaves were treated as property under the law of the slave states, then
they should not be counted as persons for representational purposes. Some delegates also
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between the federal government and the states.34 Finally, and most
importantly for present purposes, it was true of the controversy that
led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
As proposed by the Convention, the new Constitution lacked a
declaration of rights. This proved to be a serious political miscalculation. Although the Antifederalists opposed the Constitution for
many reasons, the objection that had the greatest resonance was the
absence of a bill of rights that would protect the liberties of the
people against the greatly expanded powers of the federal government.
In response, the Federalists made a variety of arguments. First,
they said, however necessary a bill of rights might be in a nation like
England, where the people enjoyed only such liberties as they succeeded in wresting from the monarch, the situation was entirely
different in America, where governments had only such powers as the
people chose to confer upon them.35 Moreover, even if bills of rights
were required to protect the people against the state governments,
which were vested with general powers, no such protection were
necessary at the federal level, for the new government would have
only those powers enumerated in the Constitution—powers that the
Federalists insisted did not extend to interfering with religious
freedom, regulating the press, or other matters of individual liberty.36
Indeed, the Federalists argued, a bill of rights would be dangerous,
for it might imply that the Constitution had granted the federal
government powers in these areas, powers that it was necessary to
limit.37 Moreover, it was impossible to enumerate all of the people’s

denounced slavery on moral grounds. The southern states remained intransigent, however, and
the northern delegates ultimately felt compelled to accept to a compromise, under which slaves
would count as three-fifths of a person for purposes of both representation and direct taxation.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The Convention struck a similar compromise on the slave
trade: Congress was barred from outlawing the interstate or international slave trade prior to
1808, but was permitted to impose a tax on the trade during this period. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
The Constitution also included other concessions to slavery, most notably the Fugitive Slave
Clause. For an account of the debates over slavery, see PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE
FOUNDERS ch. 1 (1995).
34. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 13, at 230 (James Madison).
35. See, e.g., Speech of James Wilson in Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28,
1787), in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 436 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1863) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S
DEBATES]; THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 13, at 512–13 (Alexander Hamilton).
36. See, e.g., Speech of James Wilson at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), in
1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 64 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993).
37. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 13, at 513–14 (Alexander Hamilton).
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rights, and the omission of a particular right would imply that it was
not one that the people meant to retain.38
During the ratification controversy, Madison made similar arguments in opposition to Antifederalist demands for a bill of rights.39
But his resistance to a bill of rights also stemmed from his fundamental concern about the problem of faction.40 First, as he explained in a
letter to Jefferson, the effects of faction made it unlikely “that a
positive declaration of some of the most essential rights could . . . be
obtained in the requisite latitude.”41 This was particularly true of
religious liberty.42 Second, experience at the state level had proven
that bills of rights were ineffective when they were most needed.
Factional politics had led to “[r]epeated violations of these parchment
barriers . . . by overbearing majorities in every State.”43 Once again,
Madison cited religious freedom as an example. Recalling the battles
that he and Jefferson had recently fought in Virginia, he observed
that if the legislature had the support of a popular majority, it would
not hesitate to establish a religion in blatant violation of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights and the recently enacted Statute for Religious
Freedom.44 In short, the impact of faction would make it difficult to
obtain a strong enough declaration of fundamental rights, or to
enforce such a declaration against “overbearing majorities.”45 For all
these reasons, Madison resisted Antifederalist demands for a bill of
rights. Indeed, he was sometimes inclined to regard those demands as
themselves rooted in faction—that is, in a “zeal for [particular]
opinions concerning . . . government,” or in “an attachment to [particular] leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power,”

38. See, e.g., Debate of James Wilson and John Smilie at the Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 36, at 808.
39. See, e.g., Speech of James Madison in Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 24, 1788), in
3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 35, at 620; Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson
(Oct. 17, 1788), in THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS, supra note 13, at 564–65 [hereinafter Letter
from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788)]. For discussions of Madison’s initial opposition to
and subsequent support for a bill of rights, see LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF
LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 279–90 (1995);
Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT.
REV. 301; Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Theory of Rights, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 245
(1990).
40. See Rakove, supra note 39, at 252–55.
41. Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), supra note 39, at 564.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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or as a camouflage for the defense of political or economic interests
that might be threatened by the adoption of the new Constitution.46
As Madison soon discovered, however, the demand for a bill of
rights could not be so easily dismissed. Instead, while some opponents of the Constitution made this demand for merely tactical
reasons, others sincerely believed that a declaration of rights was
essential to protect the liberties of the people—a view that had
substantial support among the public. Under these circumstances,
compromise was a political necessity. To secure ratification in several
key states, the Federalists found it necessary to give assurances that
the first Congress to meet under the new Constitution would consider
the adoption of a bill of rights.
After making such a commitment during his campaign for election to the House of Representatives,47 Madison regarded himself as
duty-bound to propose a bill of rights in the First Congress and to
push for its adoption, despite considerable difficulties and opposition.
These efforts made him the key figure in the adoption of the Bill of
Rights.
On June 8, 1789, Madison introduced his proposals in the House,
in a speech that provides great insight into the nature of the Bill of
Rights.48 In this speech, Madison offered two major justifications for
the adoption of a bill of rights. First, he emphasized the need to
promote national unity by responding to the legitimate concerns of
those who had opposed the Constitution. “It cannot be a secret to the
gentlemen in this House,” he observed, that while the Constitution
had been ratified by eleven of the thirteen states, “yet still there is a
great number of our constituents who are dissatisfied with it,” because they feared that it would endanger their liberties.49 However
mistaken this belief might be, Madison conceded that it was sincerely
46. The quotations are taken from THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 13, at 79 (James
Madison). For Madison’s criticisms of the Antifederalists and their motives, see Finkelman,
supra note 39, at 320–21.
47. See Finkelman, supra note 39, at 335–36.
48. See Speech of James Madison to the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in 5 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 24 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter
Madison Bill of Rights Speech]. The debates over the Bill of Rights may be found in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS
77–86 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS], which also
includes a comprehensive legislative history of the Bill of Rights. (All citations to congressional
debates from this volume are to debates of the House of Representatives in 1789.) For
Madison’s proposed amendments to the Constitution, see Madison Resolution, in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 11–14.
49. Madison Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 48, at 24.
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held and deserving of respect.50 On “principles of amity and moderation,” he argued, Congress should “conform to their wishes, and
expressly declare the great rights of mankind secured under this
constitution.”51 In this way, Madison hoped to “render [the Constitution] as acceptable to the whole people of the United States, as it has
been found acceptable to a majority of them.”52
Second, Madison argued that the adoption of a bill of rights was
justified in principle. Echoing Jefferson, he asserted that “it is proper
that every Government should be disarmed of powers which trench
upon” the essential liberties of the people.53 In exploring those
liberties, Madison invoked the theory of natural rights and the social
contract—a theory that was widely accepted by Federalists and
Antifederalists alike. According to that view, society was formed for
the protection of life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness.
All political power was originally vested in the people, who had the
inalienable right not only to institute a particular form of government,
but also to reform or change that government whenever they found it
necessary to do so.54 In addition to these political powers, the people
would insist on the protection of other rights. These included not
only natural rights, such as freedom of speech, but also certain
50. Id.
51. Id. Earlier, this theme had been sounded in President Washington’s inaugural address,
which Madison drafted. See George Washington’s Inaugural Address (April 30, 1789), in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 233, 234 (urging Congress to consider
amending the Constitution in a way that would reflect “reverence for the characteristic rights of
freemen, and a regard for public harmony”).
52. Madison Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 48, at 24; see also CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 73 (remarks of Rep. Madison during debate of June 8) (“The
applications for amendments come from a very respectable number of our constituents, and it is
certainly proper for Congress to consider the subject, in order to quiet that anxiety which
prevails in the public mind.”). In addition to reconciling many individual opponents to the
Constitution, Madison hoped that the adoption of a bill of rights would induce the two
remaining states, North Carolina and Rhode Island, to ratify the Constitution. See Madison Bill
of Rights Speech, supra note 48, at 24.
53. Madison Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 48, at 28. For Jefferson’s views, see Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS,
supra note 13, at 512–13.
54. Madison’s first proposed amendment would have inserted the following declaration at
the beginning of the Constitution:
[T]hat all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from, the people.
That Government is instituted and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people;
which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using
property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or
change their Government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes
of its institution.
Madison Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 48, at 25.
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“positive rights,” such as trial by jury, that imposed limits on the
manner in which the government could exercise its powers.55 As
Madison explained, “[t]rial by jury cannot be considered as a natural
right, but a right resulting from a social compact, . . . but is as essential
to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent rights
of nature.”56 Finally, eighteenth-century liberal theory included
certain doctrines, such as the separation of powers, which were
supposed to be necessary for the protection of liberty.57 These rights
and principles were contained in the declarations of rights that had
been adopted in many of the states, and Madison proposed to incorporate them into the Federal Constitution as well.58
After setting forth his proposed amendments, Madison responded to the various objections to a bill of rights that had been
raised during the ratification debates.59 Among others, he discussed
the objection that he himself had found most powerful:60 that, in a
republic, the “greatest danger” of abuse of power came from the
community itself, “operating by the majority against the minority,”
and that “all paper barriers against the power of the community are
too weak to be worthy of attention.”61 Although he acknowledged
the force of this objection, Madison responded that declarations of
rights could perform an important political and cultural function
within the community: because such declarations “have a tendency to
impress some degree of respect for them, to establish the public
opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole community, [they] may be one means to control the majority from those acts
to which they might be otherwise inclined.”62 In addition to this

55. Id. at 26. Madison’s notes for his speech list freedom of speech as a leading example of
the “natural rights . . . retained” by the people. See Madison’s Notes for Amendments Speech
(1789), in 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1042
(1971).
56. Madison Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 48, at 26.
57. See id. (discussing doctrine of separation of powers).
58. See id. For some leading examples of state bills of rights, see VIRGINIA DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS of 1776, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 3; PENNSYLVANIA
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 6;
MASSACHUSETTS CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at
7.
59. See Madison Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 48, at 27–28.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 43–45.
61. Madison Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 48, at 27.
62. Id. As Madison had earlier put the point in his correspondence with Jefferson, “[t]he
political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental
maxims of free Government, and as they become incorporated with the national sentiment,
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influence on public opinion, Madison identified two further lines of
defense for the liberties set forth in a bill of rights. One was legal.
Following Jefferson, Madison observed that, if such provisions
are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of
justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians
of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every
assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be
naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly
stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights.63

A second defense was political: if the national government sought to
exceed its bounds, it could be checked by other centers of power
within the federal system. In particular, the state legislatures would
“closely watch the operations of [the Federal] Government,” and
would be in a position to resist encroachments on liberty.64
In conclusion, Madison returned to his original theme: the need
for compromise and consensus. “[I]f we can make the Constitution
better in the opinion of those who are opposed to it,” he asserted,
“without weakening its frame, or abridging its usefulness, in the
judgment of those who are attached to it, we act the part of wise and
liberal men.”65 In part, as Madison stressed, this course of action was
a matter of prudence, for the success of the new government depended on public support.66 Yet it was also a matter of principle. As
Lance Banning has argued, Madison “believed that a republic ultimately rests on mutual respect among its citizens and on a recognition
on the part of all that they are the constituents of a community of
mutually regarding equals. . . .”67 By deferring to those who desired a
bill of rights, the Federalists would “exemplify [this] mutual respect,”68 and thereby strengthen the national consensus in favor of the
Constitution.69
counteract the impulses of interest and passion.” Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 17,
1788), supra note 39, at 565.
63. Madison Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 48, at 27–28. In urging upon Madison the
benefits of a bill of rights, Jefferson had placed some emphasis on “the legal check which it puts
into the hands of the judiciary.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15,
1789), in THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS, supra note 13, at 587.
64. Madison Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 48, at 28.
65. Id. at 28–29.
66. See id. at 24.
67. BANNING, supra note 39, at 287. Similarly, Paul Finkelman remarks that Madison’s
support for the Bill of Rights reflected the traditional ideal of politics as consensus. Finkelman,
supra note 39, at 344.
68. BANNING, supra note 39, at 287.
69. For a concise statement combining these prudential and principled considerations, see
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 113 (remarks of Rep. Madison during debate
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At the same time, Madison was fully aware that the adoption of a
bill of rights would itself require a consensus. Under Article V of the
Constitution, amendments could be adopted only with the approval
of two-thirds of each House of Congress, as well as three-fourths of
the state legislatures.70 In order to ensure such broad support, Madison emphasized that he was proposing to incorporate in the Constitution only “those provisions for the security of rights, against which I
believe no serious objection has been made by any class of our
constituents.”71
Madison’s speech sounded the keynote for the congressional debates on the Bill of Rights. As many members observed, the adoption of a bill of rights was necessary to reconcile a considerable part
of the community to the Constitution, and to reassure the people that
their liberties would be secure under the new government.72 Under
the terms of Article V, amendments could be adopted only when they
had broad support. For this reason, amendments should be confined

of Aug. 13) (urging the House to approve a bill of rights and “thereby promote that spirit of
urbanity and unanimity which the government itself stands in need of for its more full support”).
70. U.S. CONST. art. V.
71. Madison Bill of Rights Speech, supra note 48, at 24; see also CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 200 (remarks of Rep. Madison) (objecting to the consideration of
propositions not likely to attain the necessary constitutional majority). These themes were also
prominent in Madison’s private correspondence during this period. See, e.g., Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 21, 1788), in 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS, supra note 13,
at 552 (noting that some Federalists favored responding to the demand for constitutional
amendments by “introducing those supplemental safeguards to liberty against which no
objections can be raised”); Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (June 15, 1789), in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 250–51 (observing that “[n]othing of a
controvertible nature” could be expected to attain the requisite constitutional majority); Letter
from James Madison to Samuel Johnson (June 21, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 48, at 253 (same); Letter from James Madison to Tench Coxe (June 24, 1789), in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 254 (noting that his proposed amendments
sought to “avoid[] all controvertible points which might endanger the assent of 2/3 of each
branch of Congs. and 3/4 of the State Legislatures”).
72. See, e.g., CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 94 (remarks of Rep.
Sumter during debate of June 8); id. at 101 (remarks of Rep. Ames during debate of July 21); id.
at 113, 117 (remarks of Rep. Page during debate of Aug. 13); id. at 115 (remarks of Rep.
Hartley); id. at 161 (remarks of Rep. Hartley during debate of Aug. 15); id. at 169 (remarks of
Rep. Gerry). By contrast, those Antifederalists who wished for more substantial amendments
reducing the power of the federal government objected that the proposed amendments to
protect individual rights were “little better than whip-syllabub, frothy and full of wind, formed
only to please the palate, or they are like a tub thrown out to a whale, to secure the freight of
the ship and its peaceable voyage”—that is, that they were a mere diversionary tactic by the
Federalists, intended to distract the people’s minds from the need for major structural changes
in the new Constitution. Id. at 175 (remarks of Rep. Burke); see also id. at 210 (remarks of Rep.
Livermore); Kenneth R. Bowling, “A Tub to the Whale”: The Founding Fathers and Adoption of
the Federal Bill of Rights, 8 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 223 (1988).
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to those that were likely to attain the requisite constitutional majorities.73
This recognition of the need for consensus had crucial implications for the drafting of the Bill of Rights. Civil liberties issues were
hardly less controversial during the founding period than they are
today. To secure a consensus, then, it was necessary to draft the
provisions in relatively general terms on which the great majority of
people could agree, without seeking to anticipate or resolve controversial issues regarding the meaning and scope of those rights or their
application to particular situations.
A striking illustration of this point may be found in the House
debates over the First Amendment itself. During the course of these
debates, the Antifederalist Thomas Tudor Tucker of South Carolina
moved to add language to protect the right of the people “to instruct
their representatives.”74 This motion provoked a long, spirited, and
highly illuminating discussion.75 Supporters of the Tucker amendment contended that it simply recognized the right of the sovereign
people to express their will through the political process.76 Opponents
responded that the amendment was either unnecessary or dangerous.
On one hand, if it merely recognized the right of the people to
communicate with their representatives, it was superfluous, for that
right would be fully secured by the proposals to protect the freedoms
of speech, press, and petition.77 On the other hand, if the amendment
meant to imply that such instructions would be binding, it would
subvert the deliberative process by requiring representatives to
promote local views and interests at the expense of the common
good. “[W]hen the people have chosen a representative,” asserted
the Federalist Roger Sherman of Connecticut, “it is his duty to meet
73. See, e.g., CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 143 (remarks of Rep.
Livermore during debate of Aug. 14); id. at 178 (remarks of Rep. Sedgwick during debate of
Aug. 15) (opposing extensive debate on proposals “when there was no likelihood they would
meet the approbation of two-thirds of both houses, and three-fourths of the state legislatures”);
id. (remarks of Rep. Smith) (observing that it was “useless” to push for the adoption of “a
measure . . . which was unlikely to meet the approbation of two-thirds of the house”).
Conversely, those who opposed consideration of constitutional amendments denied that they
were necessary to satisfy the public, or that they were likely to be adopted by the necessary
majority. See, e.g., id. at 93 (remarks of Rep. Sherman during debate of June 6); id. at 98
(remarks of Rep. Sherman during debate of July 21); id. at 101 (remarks of Rep. Ames during
debate of July 21).
74. Id. at 161 (motion by Rep. Tucker during debate of Aug. 15).
75. See id. at 161–77.
76. See, e.g., id. at 163, 173 (remarks of Rep. Page); id. at 165–66, 170 (remarks of Rep.
Gerry).
77. See id. at 167 (remarks of Rep. Madison).
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others from the different parts of the union, and consult, and agree
with them to such acts as are for the general benefit of the whole
community; if they were to be guided by instructions, there would be
no use in deliberation. . . .”78 Finally, opponents contended that
instructions were often used for “party purposes,” and thus would
have a strong tendency to promote factionalism.79
While Madison fully shared these objections, he also opposed the
Tucker amendment on more general grounds. A bill of rights, he
reminded the House, could be adopted only with the support of a
strong consensus. “[I]f we confine ourselves to an enumeration of
simple acknowledged principles, the ratification will meet with but
little difficulty.”80 But to pursue amendments of a controversial or
“doubtful nature” “obliges us to run the risk of losing the whole
system.”81 Echoing these views, the Federalist Theodore Sedgwick of
Massachusetts urged his colleagues to avoid inserting controversial
propositions that were “more likely to produce acrimony, than that
spirit of harmony which we ought to cultivate.”82
For these reasons, the Bill of Rights was written in general terms
that could command a consensus. But this consensus could be
maintained only at a general level. When the Bill of Rights came to
be applied to particular issues, it would inevitably be subject to
competing interpretations, reflecting different interests and ideological views. This point accords with Madison’s understanding of
faction, as well as his reflections during the founding era on the
drafting and interpretation of constitutions. As he observed in The
Federalist No. 37, the difficulty in drafting constitutions arose not only
from the limitations of human reason, but also from the complex

78. Id. at 164 (remarks of Rep. Sherman); see also id. at 162 (remarks of Rep. Hartley).
79. Id. at 161–62 (remarks of Rep. Hartley); see also id. at 164 (remarks of Rep. Jackson)
(asserting that the effect of the Tucker amendment would be to “drive the house into a number
of factions, there might be different instructions from every state, and the representation from
each state would be a faction to support its own measures”); id. at 171 (remarks of Rep.
Livermore); id. at 176 (remarks of Rep. Laurance); cf. id. at 166 (remarks of Rep. Gerry)
(responding to the factionalism argument).
80. Id. at 167 (remarks of Rep. Madison).
81. Id. at 167–68. As the debate drew to a close, Madison once more argued that there was
“little prospect” that amendments that would “change the principles of the government, or that
are of a doubtful nature,” could obtain the constitutional majority required for ratification;
“therefore, as a friend to what is attainable, I would limit it to the plain, simple, and important
security that has been required,” that is, recognition of “those great and essential rights which
[the people] had been taught to believe were in danger.” Id. at 176.
82. Id. at 172 (remarks of Rep. Sedgwick).
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nature of political institutions.83 Moreover, language was an imperfect and “cloudy medium” for articulating political ideas.84 In short,
as Madison remarked in a letter to Jefferson, it was impossible to
draft constitutional provisions “in such a manner, as to be free from
different constructions by different interests, or even from ambiguity
in the judgment of the impartial.”85 Although these observations
were made in the context of federalism and the separation of powers,
they would appear no less applicable to the Bill of Rights.
C.

The First Amendment and the Sedition Act

What I have said of the Bill of Rights is true in particular of the
First Amendment. The debates in the First Congress show that
freedom of speech was regarded as “a self-evident unalienable right
which the people possess,” and which the First Amendment was
meant to secure.86 At the same time, the debates make clear that the
Amendment was not intended to resolve controversial issues about
the scope or limits of this right. Instead, as Madison stressed in the
debate over the Tucker proposal, the First Amendment was meant to
be a statement of “simple acknowledged principles” on which all
could agree.87 Only in this way could the First Amendment and the
rest of the Bill of Rights obtain the consensus necessary for adoption.
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 13, at 228–29 (James Madison). For an illuminating discussion of The Federalist No. 37 and its implications for constitutional interpretation, see
RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 156–60.
84. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 13, at 229 (James Madison).
85. Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), supra note 13, at 499–500.
86. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 159 (remarks of Rep. Sedgwick) (“If
the people freely converse together, they must assemble for that purpose; it is a self-evident
unalienable right which the people possess. . . .”). Further support for this proposition may be
found in Madison’s notes for his speech introducing the Bill of Rights, see supra note 55, and in
Roger Sherman’s draft of the Bill of Rights, which included the following provision—a
provision that appears to have had an important influence on the drafting of the First Amendment:
The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them when they enter
into society, Such are the rights of conscience in matters of religion; of acquiring property, and of pursuing happiness & safety; of Speaking, writing and publishing their
Sentiments with decency and freedom; of peaceably Assembling to consult their common good, and of applying to Government by petition or remonstrance for redress of
grievances. Of these rights therefore they Shall not be deprived by the government of
the united States.
Roger Sherman’s Proposed Committee Report (July 21–28), in CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 267 (emphasis added). On the natural rights background of the First
Amendment, see Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry Into the Foundations and
Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1282–91 (1998) [hereinafter Heyman,
Righting the Balance].
87. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 167.
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At the same time, however, this approach left the First Amendment
open to differing interpretations—interpretations that would inevitably be shaped by ideological conflict.
Such conflict was not long in coming. During the 1790s, American politics was dominated by increasingly bitter divisions between
the governing Federalists and the Republican opposition led by
Jefferson and Madison.88 Alarmed by what they saw as the Federalists’ aristocratic or even monarchical tendencies, as well as by Alexander Hamilton’s efforts to create a strong centralized economic
system, the Republicans accused their opponents of seeking to
undermine democracy and to erect a consolidated national government on the ruins of the states. In turn, the Federalists regarded the
Jeffersonians as dangerously subversive, not only in their domestic
politics but also in their sympathy with the French Revolution. In the
summer of 1798, at the height of fears over incipient war with France,
the Federalist-controlled Congress passed the Sedition Act.89 This
statute, which was intended to suppress strident criticism from the
Republican press, made it a criminal offense to publish “any false,
scandalous and malicious writing” against the government, the
Congress, or the President of the United States, “with intent to
defame [them] or to bring them . . . into contempt or disrepute; or to
excite against them . . . the hatred of the good people of the United
States.”90
From a modern perspective, the unconstitutionality of the Sedition Act appears beyond dispute: few people would deny that the
right to criticize the government and its officials is the hallmark of a
democratic society and part of “the central meaning of the First
Amendment.”91 At the time the Act was adopted, however, its
constitutionality was a sharply contested issue.
At first glance, the Act would appear to violate the plain language of the First Amendment. However, as John Marshall observed
in the most powerful Federalist defense of the Act, the First Amend-

88. For a comprehensive account of this period, see STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK,
THE AGE OF FEDERALISM (1993).
89. 1 Stat. 596 (1798). On the history of the Sedition Act, see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS,
FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE” chs. 2–4 (2000); ELKINS & MCKITRICK,
supra note 88, ch. XV; JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS (1956).
90. 1 Stat. 596, § 2.
91. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964); see Harry Kalven, Jr., The
New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP.
CT. REV. 191.
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ment only barred Congress from passing laws “‘ABRIDGING the
freedom of speech or of the press.’”92 The issue thus turned on the
meaning of this phrase. But the liberty of the press, Marshall argued,
was a term that had a well-defined and “completely understood”
meaning under the common law: “It signifies a liberty to publish, free
from previous restraint, any thing and every thing at the discretion of
the printer only, but not the liberty of spreading with impunity false
and scandalous slanders which may destroy the peace and mangle the
reputation of an individual or of a community.”93
In support of this position, Marshall and other Federalists invoked Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England,94 the most
influential legal treatise in late eighteenth-century England and
America.95 Under the common law, Blackstone wrote, “[e]very
freemen [sic] has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he
pleases before the public.”96 This right was part of the natural liberty
of mankind, and was “essential to the nature of a free state.”97 On
these grounds, Blackstone denounced systems of prior censorship
that would “subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one
man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and government.”98 For Blackstone, however, the liberty of the press, like almost all forms of
liberty, was subject to regulation by law for the common good.99
Speech that was defamatory, immoral, or subversive constituted an
abuse of liberty or “licentiousness.”100 According to Blackstone, the
law could restrict such expression without violating the liberty of the
press.101 Indeed, such restrictions were “necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only

92. John Marshall, Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 22, 1799), in 5
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 136, 138 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I)
(emphasis added by Marshall) [hereinafter Marshall, Report].
93. Id. at 138.
94. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (St. George
Tucker ed., 1803 & photo. reprint 1969).
95. For an exploration of Blackstone’s views on the liberty of the press, see Heyman,
Righting the Balance, supra note 86, at 1284–87.
96. 4 BLACKSTONE at *152.
97. Id. at *151.
98. Id. at *152.
99. See 1 id. at *125 (defining civil liberty as natural liberty restrained by law for the
common good).
100. 4 id. at *151–54.
101. Id.
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solid foundations of civil liberty.”102 This was particularly true of laws
against seditious libel, which undermined the authority that made law
and government possible.
If the Federalists could rely upon Blackstone and the common
law, however, the Republicans could draw upon another important
tradition—the body of libertarian and republican thought that
Americans had inherited from Locke and the English radical Whigs,
and that had provided the ideological justification for the American
Revolution.103 This tradition held a much more expansive view of
liberty of speech and press than did Blackstone. According to Cato’s
Letters,104 a leading work in this tradition, freedom of thought and
speech were not merely natural rights but inalienable ones—rights
that individuals would not surrender when they entered civil society.105 Although these liberties were bounded by the rights of other
individuals and the community itself, they were not subject to regulation whenever the legislature believed that this would promote the
common good.106 In this way, Cato’s Letters defended a stronger
individual liberty of speech and thought. For Cato, freedom of
speech also played an important political function in checking abuse
of power by the government and its officials.107 This aspect of Cato’s
doctrine rested on the republican, even revolutionary, premise that
the people retained the ultimate sovereignty, and that they had a right
to supervise and check the actions of their rulers, who were merely
the agents or “trustees of the people” in the conduct of public af-

102. Id. at *152.
103. On this body of thought and its influence in eighteenth-century America, see
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 331–51
(enlarged ed., 1992); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–
1787 (1969) [hereinafter WOOD, CREATION]; MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS
REPUBLIC (1996).
104. JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S LETTERS (Ronald Hamowy ed.,
1995) [hereinafter CATO’S LETTERS]. For fuller discussions of Cato’s views of freedom of
speech, see LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 109–14 (1985); Heyman,
Righting the Balance, supra note 86, at 1283–84.
105. See 1 CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 104, no. 62.
106. See id. no. 15, at 110 (asserting that freedom of speech is bounded only by the rights of
others); id. no. 62, at 432 (contending that liberty includes “[t]he privileges of thinking, saying,
and doing what we please . . . without any other restriction, than that by all this we hurt not the
publick, nor one another”).
107. See id. no. 15. On this function, see Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977).

HEYMAN 6-17

2003]

6/17/03 3:55 PM

IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

551

fairs.108 On these grounds, Cato’s Letters sharply criticized the common law of seditious libel.109
Whether the Sedition Act was constitutional thus depended in
large part on whether one understood the First Amendment in
Blackstonian or in radical Whig terms. Both traditions had deep
roots in American political culture, and both were widely held at the
time that the Bill of Rights was adopted. Yet the First Amendment
made no effort to endorse either view, or to resolve the conflict
between them. To do so would have been to take a position on a
controversial issue that had not yet arisen—precisely the approach
that Madison feared would jeopardize the entire project of a bill of
rights. Instead of adopting a particular position, the drafters of the
First Amendment confined themselves to a statement of general
principles, on the ground that this was the only way to obtain the
broad consensus necessary for adoption and ratification.110 The effect
was to leave any difficult or controversial questions on the nature and
scope of freedom of speech to another day.
It follows that the constitutionality of the Sedition Act could not
be definitively resolved by appealing either to the language or to the
original understanding of the First Amendment. Instead, the critical
question was which view—conservative or libertarian-republican—
was most consistent with the American understanding of freedom of
speech or (more broadly) with the nature of American society and
government. On behalf of the Federalists, Marshall spoke in Blackstonian terms of the need to control the “licentiousness” of the
press.111 At the same time, he sought to transform Blackstone’s
argument into terms more acceptable to Americans. For example,
while Blackstone defended the common law’s proscription of blasphemous as well as defamatory and seditious libels,112 Marshall
confined his argument to defamation and sedition, stressing the way
in which such speech violated the rights of individuals and the community.113 Moreover, Marshall treated sedition as an injury less to the
government than to the people themselves, who had established the
government to promote their own safety and happiness.114 In this
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

1 CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 104, no. 15. The quotation appears in id. at 111.
See id. no. 32; 2 id. no. 100.
See supra text accompanying notes 70–82.
Marshall, Report, supra note 92, at 138.
See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *151.
See Marshall, Report, supra note 92, at 138.
See id. at 137.
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way, Marshall sought to adapt the traditional idea of sedition to
American notions of popular sovereignty.
Responding on behalf of the Republicans, Madison contended
that the Sedition Act was at war with popular sovereignty.115 Laws
against seditious libel might be appropriate in “such a government as
that of Great Britain,” in which the King and the House of Lords
were hereditary and not responsible to the people.116 But such
restrictions were much less appropriate in the United States, where
both the legislature and the executive were elective and responsible.117
Madison reinforced this argument by appealing to the political
culture of America, where the press commonly examined the merits
of public men and measures with a freedom that went beyond “the
strict limits of the common law.”118 Echoing the radical Whigs,
Madison argued that “it is the duty, as well as right, of intelligent and
faithful citizens” to oversee the government and thereby prevent
abuse of power; and that if any branch of government failed “to duly
discharge[] its trust[,] it is natural and proper, that, according to the
cause and degree of their faults, they should [in the language of the
Sedition Act] be brought into contempt or disrepute, and incur the
hatred of the people.”119 Although Madison acknowledged that the
Sedition Act (in a concession to libertarian doctrine) had departed
from the common law and allowed truth as a defense, he denied that
this provided adequate protection for free speech.120 Even where
facts alone were at issue, it might be difficult to prove them in court.121
More importantly, sedition prosecutions would often be brought on
account of opinions rather than facts, and opinions were not provable
before a court of law in the same way that facts were.122 Finally,
Madison observed “that the right of electing the members of the
Government constitutes more particularly the essence of a free and
responsible government,” and that the “value and efficacy of this
right” depended on the ability to freely discuss “the comparative
merits and demerits of the candidates.”123 The Sedition Act would
115. James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 141, 142–144 [hereinafter Madison, Report].
116. Id. at 142.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 142–43.
119. Id. at 144.
120. Id. at 145.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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interfere with this right by shielding incumbents from criticism during
elections.124
Ultimately, then, the debate over the Sedition Act involved a
clash between two different visions of the American political, social,
and cultural order. The Federalists adhered to the traditionalist ideal
of a strong, well-ordered society that was governed (in the name of
the people) by a virtuous and enlightened elite, and in which individual liberty was tempered by the values of order, morality, religion,
and respect for authority.125 The Republicans, on the other hand,
viewed their opponents as antirepublican and inclined toward aristocracy.126 Republicans tended to exalt the values of individual liberty,
small government, and popular sovereignty.127
Although Federalists on the federal bench consistently upheld
the Sedition Act,128 the political controversy over the Act played an
important role in the “Revolution of 1800,” in which Jefferson and his
supporters won control of the national government.129 Acting on the
view that the Act was unconstitutional, Jefferson pardoned those
convicted of violating it.130 In this way, it may be said that the controversy over the Sedition Act was resolved in favor of the Republican
position. Yet the debate between the Blackstonian conservative and
the libertarian view on seditious libel continued for much of the
following two centuries.131 The Sedition Act was finally laid to rest
only in New York Times v. Sullivan,132 which declared that “the attack
upon [the Act’s] validity has carried the day in the court of history.”133

124. Id.
125. See, e.g., ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 88, at 702–03, 727.
126. See id. at 724.
127. See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, First Inaugural Address, in WRITINGS 494–95 (Merrill
D. Peterson ed., 1984).
128. See, e.g., In re Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 839–40 (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (No. 5,126) (charge of
Iredell, J., to grand jury).
129. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 88, ch. XV.
130. See SMITH, supra note 89, at 268.
131. See, e.g., St. George Tucker, Of the Right of Conscience; and of the Freedom of Speech
and of the Press, in 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, app. G, at 14–30 (condemning the Sedition
Act as a violation of First Amendment); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION §§ 1878–83 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (criticizing Tucker and
defending Blackstonian view of liberty of the press); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (rejecting the government’s “argument . . . that the First
Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in force”).
132. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
133. Id. at 276.
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D. Reflections
This brief exploration of the founding period suggests the following reflections on ideological conflict, constitutional interpretation,
and the First Amendment.
1. Diversity—As Madison recognized, diversity is inevitable in
modern societies, and especially in free ones. This diversity arises
from differences in religious, moral, and political beliefs, in social
status, and in economic interests, as well as other differences that
Madison did not focus on, including race, ethnicity, gender, and
sexual orientation. For Madison, a central challenge for American
constitutionalism was how to respond to such diversity and the
conflicts that arise from it—an observation that seems even truer now
than at the time he wrote.
2. Should diversity and conflict be regarded as evils?—Although
Madison regarded diversity as inevitable, he tended to assimilate it to
social division and faction, which he (in common with the prevailing
view in the eighteenth century) regarded as evils. Madison’s fear that
faction would divide society into opposing groups, “inflame[] them
with mutual animosity, and render[] them much more disposed to vex
and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good”134
continues to have a powerful resonance in contemporary society.
Few people would wish to live in a society riven by unrestrained
social, cultural, and political conflict. Nevertheless, I believe that
Madison’s view of social division and conflict is darker than the view
that prevails, or that ought to prevail, in contemporary America. This
is true for several reasons.
a. Social unity vs. diversity—Although Madison’s empirical
analysis of modern society led him to conclude that diversity was
inevitable, his condemnation of faction presupposed a more traditional normative view that emphasized the value of social unity and
harmony.135 But the foundations of this traditional view were increasingly undermined by many developments, including the Reformation
and the religious and political conflicts to which it gave rise; the
settlement of America by many diverse national, ethnic, cultural, and
religious groups; and the economic developments that Madison
himself described.136 By the nineteenth century, liberal political
134. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 13, at 79 (James Madison).
135. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 88, at 263–64 (describing the traditional view).
136. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 13, at 79 (James Madison).
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theorists such as Tocqueville and Mill were more likely to stress the
value of diversity than its evils.137 Likewise, contemporary American
society often views diversity in a positive rather than a negative light.
b. Materialism—While Madison disapproved of all forms of faction, he considered those based on economic interests to be “natural”
in the sense that they arose from real and substantial factors.138 By
contrast, his attitude toward other sources of division was scathing.
Writing to Jefferson, he described them as mere “artificial [distinctions] . . . founded on accidental differences in political, religious and
other opinions. . . .”139 “However erroneous or ridiculous,” he added,
“these grounds of dissention and faction may appear to the enlightened Statesman, or the benevolent philosopher, the bulk of mankind
who are neither Statesmen nor Philosophers, will continue to view
them in a different light.”140 This suggested some of the reasons why
factions based on opinion were so unnecessary and dangerous, and
why it was essential to control them.
Undeniably, this sort of materialism, or anti-idealism, has been
an important strand in American constitutional theory. For example,
it is prominent in the jurisprudence of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, including his free speech opinions.141 There is, however,
another equally important strand of American constitutional thought
that holds that social, cultural, and religious life have value for their
own sake, and that this is an important reason why they should
receive constitutional protection.142 Similarly, while some forms of

137. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 3 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co.
1975) (1859); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop eds., 2000); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE
REVOLUTION (Francois Furet & Francoise Mélonio eds., Alan S. Kahan trans., University of
Chicago Press 1998).
138. Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), supra note 13, at 501.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. For example, much of Justice Holmes’s defense of free speech depends on the notion
that “time has upset many fighting faiths,” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting), and that truth is ultimately a function of what is accepted by “the
dominant forces in the community,” Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). For a critique of Holmes’s materialism, see ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM ch. 3 (1960).
142. For example, in Olmstead v. United States, Justice Brandeis wrote:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
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modern social science take a materialist approach, others hold that
human beings are essentially cultural beings. As Madison recognized,
many ordinary people also regard these areas of life as having important value.143 But differences in opinion may give rise to political and
constitutional controversy. For these reasons, we may be less inclined
than Madison to regard ideological conflict as illegitimate.
c. The nature of truth—In The Federalist No. 10, Madison attributed differences in opinion to the fallibility of human reason.144 As
this passage implies, Madison was inclined to hold an objective
conception of truth. This was true not only of his political analysis,
which aspired to scientific rigor, but also of his normative views,
which generally accorded with the self-evident truths of the Lockean
tradition. For example, Madison had no doubt that laws authorizing
paper money, debtor relief, and other interferences with the rights of
property were unjust.145 When he spoke of faction in this connection,
it was the supporters of such measures that he generally had in mind.
By contrast, he would not use this term to describe those who, like
himself, opposed such measures and sought to proscribe them in the
new Constitution.
In more recent times, some historians have reversed Madison’s
account, and have described the Federalists as a faction motivated by
their own interests.146 The most reasonable approach, however, is to
see both groups as having their own interests and their own conception of justice and the common good. On this view, it cannot be said
that either position was simply factious and improper. Instead, the
social and political controversy over this issue appears not only
inevitable but also legitimate.

277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927). As the above quotations from Madison suggest, however, while this
passage reflected Brandeis’s own view, not all of the framers would have endorsed it in
unqualified terms.
143. See supra text accompanying note 140.
144. See supra text accompanying note 20.
145. See, e.g., Speech of Mr. Madison (June 6, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 13, at 134–36 (arguing that interferences with “the security of private
rights,” such as debtor relief laws, “were evils which had more perhaps than any thing else,
produced this convention”); Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 24., 1787), supra note 13, at
500 (asserting that proposed Constitution’s prohibitions on state issuance of paper money and
laws impairing obligation of contracts, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, did not go far enough in
preventing injustice); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 22–38 (1990).
146. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1935). For a collection of essays debating this view,
see ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1969).
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More generally, from a modern perspective, we are more inclined than Madison was to believe that diversity of thought and
belief has positive value, and that truth is most likely to emerge from
discussion and debate among those who have different perspectives.
Of course, this is an important theme in modern free speech theory.
As Mill wrote in On Liberty:
In politics, . . . it is almost a commonplace, that a party of order or
stability, and a party of progress or reform, are both necessary elements of a healthy state of political life; until the one or the other
shall have so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a party equally of
order and of progress, knowing and distinguishing what is fit to be
preserved from what ought to be swept away. Each of these modes
of thinking derives its utility from the deficiencies of the other; but
it is in a great measure the opposition of the other that keeps each
within the limits of reason and sanity. Unless opinions favourable
to democracy and to aristocracy, to property and to equality, to cooperation and to competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality and individuality, to liberty and discipline, and all the other
standing antagonisms of practical life, are expressed with equal
freedom, and enforced and defended with equal talent and energy,
there is no chance of both elements obtaining their due. . . . Truth,
in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the
reconciling and combining of opposites, that very few have minds
sufficiently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an
approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process
of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners. . . . [O]nly through diversity of opinion is there, in the existing
state of human intellect, a chance of fair play to all sides of the
truth.147

Clearly, this view is far more receptive to political and ideological controversy than is Madison’s view.
d. Reason vs. passion—For Madison, justice and the common
good could be discerned only through reason, while the most dangerous factions were animated by passion. As eighteenth-century
thinkers such as Adam Smith recognized, however, emotion or
sentiment plays an important role in moral life148—a point that
feminist theorists and others have recently reminded us of.149 While

147. MILL, supra note 137, at 46.
148. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A.L.
Macfie eds., Oxford University Press 1976) (6th ed. 1790).
149. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT (2001); SUSAN H.
WILLIAMS, TRUTH, AUTONOMY AND SPEECH: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LAW OF FREE
EXPRESSION ch. 3 (forthcoming 2003) (on file with author); WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY
(Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987). For an important collection of essays on law
and emotion, see THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes ed., 1999).
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some passions are harmful and destructive, others—such as compassion or a love of justice—may be beneficial and even indispensable, so
long as they are properly regulated.150 For this reason, it is difficult to
share Madison’s disapproval of all political movements that are
animated in some measure by passion.
e. Elitism vs. democracy—Madison’s views on reason were connected with his views on representation. As we have seen, Madison
hoped that the creation of large electoral districts in an extended
republic would result in entrusting legislative power to “a chosen
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of
their country. . . .”151 In this way, he wrote, “it may well happen that
the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people,
will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the
people themselves, convened for the purpose.”152 Within only a few
years, however, Madison himself came to believe that the rule of an
elite could pose grave dangers to the liberty and welfare of the
people.153 For this reason he became instrumental in forming a mass
political party that would represent the true interests of the people.
In so doing, he helped to sweep away the traditional ideal that held
that politics was best entrusted to an elite.154 This democratization of
American politics inevitably led to the growth of a party system—a
development that was antithetical to the view of the inherent evils of
“party and faction” set forth in The Federalist No. 10.155
f. Stability vs. progress—By holding a balance between competing factions, the Madisonian model of The Federalist No. 10 sought to
achieve a relatively stable constitutional order. By contrast, progress
often can be achieved only through ideological conflict. Madison’s
own career provides several striking examples. It was only through a
willingness to engage in highly charged ideological battles that
Madison and his various allies were able to enact the Virginia Statute

150. Madison himself seemed to recognize this point when he expressed the hope that the
representatives elected under the new Constitution would be characterized not only by
“wisdom” but also by “patriotism and love of justice,” which would prevent them from
sacrificing the public good to private or temporary considerations. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10,
supra note 13, at 82 (James Madison).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., James Madison, A Candid State of Parties, NATIONAL GAZETTE, Sept. 26,
1792, reprinted in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS, supra note 13, at 530.
154. On the decline of this ideal, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 358–69 (1991).
155. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 13, at 79 (James Madison).

HEYMAN 6-17

2003]

6/17/03 3:55 PM

IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

559

for Religious Freedom, to secure the ratification of the Constitution,
to adopt the Bill of Rights, and to advance a broad understanding of
free speech that was inconsistent with the Sedition Act. For contemporary examples, we may look to the civil rights movement and the
women’s rights movement. Of course, the question of what constitutes progress is an inherently controversial one. Whatever conception one holds, however, it seems clear that progress toward a good
social order will often require conflict. Conversely, insofar as one
believes that a good social order already exists, conflict will often be
necessary to preserve it.
g. Conclusion—For all of these reasons, I believe that while
Madison was right to regard faction as inevitable, he was wrong to
regard it as an unmitigated evil—or at least that we should not view it
in such a light today. American society is characterized by a high
degree of social, cultural, and other forms of diversity. This diversity
gives rise to differing views of justice and the common good. Such
views tend to be partial and one-sided, stressing some values at the
expense of others. As a result, these different views often come into
conflict with each other. Such conflict is an inherent part of law and
politics in a liberal democratic society. To be sure, unrestrained
conflict is destructive and must be guarded against as much as possible. If kept within appropriate bounds, however, conflict can be
beneficial, for it is only through a struggle between partial conceptions of justice and the common good that a more comprehensive
view can emerge. In short, justice and the common good cannot be
attained by standing above conflict, as Madison tended to believe, but
only through argument between competing groups and views.
3. Controlling conflict: The Federalist’s Approach—Although
Madison’s view of faction may have been overly pessimistic, he was
surely right about the need to control it. A wide range of constitutional doctrines and institutions can be seen to serve this function: not
only representation and the extended republic, but also federalism,
separation of powers, and judicial review. As The Federalist explains,
all of these facets of the Constitution are based on the premise that
conflict and controversy are inevitable, and that rather than suppressing them, constitutions should seek to confine them within institutional bounds.156
156. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, supra note 13, at 72–73 (Alexander Hamilton)
(observing that disorders of faction may be controlled by separation of powers, checks and
balances, an independent judiciary, representative institutions, and an enlarged society); id. NO.
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4. The adoption of the Bill of Rights as an alternative model for
responding to conflict—However much the Constitution might seek to
control ideological conflict, such conflict inevitably played a major
role in the debates over the drafting and ratification of the Constitution itself. In particular, it was only in response to the ideological
demands of the Antifederalists that the Constitution came to include
a bill of rights. Although Madison initially resisted these demands, he
came to believe that a bill of rights would strengthen the Constitution,
both by providing additional safeguards for liberty and by reinforcing
its legitimacy in the eyes of a large number of fellow citizens. In this
way, Madison sought to develop common ground between differing
ideological positions and groups within the community. The adoption
of the Bill of Rights represents an alternative approach to the problem of conflict: rather than seeking to neutralize and stand above
conflict, as in The Federalist No. 10, this alternative model seeks to
reconcile the opposing views by adopting what is most persuasive in
each. As I shall suggest below, this approach provides an attractive
model for constitutional adjudication in many cases.
5. The Bill of Rights as a statement of general principles—As the
debates in the First Congress show, the framers of the Bill of Rights
were acutely aware that it could be adopted only if it reflected a
broad consensus not only in Congress and the state legislatures, but
also among the people at large. For this reason, the framers declined
to address difficult or controversial issues that might endanger the
project as a whole. Instead, the Bill of Rights took the form of “an
enumeration of simple acknowledged principles” on which all could
agree.157
6. Ideological disagreement and the Bill of Rights—At the same
time, however, those who framed and ratified the Bill of Rights could
hardly have expected it to put an end to all controversy over the
rights that it contained. While they were able to agree on general
statements of principle, Americans nevertheless held differing
10 (James Madison) (emphasizing representation and an extended republic); id. NOS. 45, 46
(James Madison) (explaining how structure of federal system allows the people and states to
control and check power of federal government); id. NO. 51 (James Madison) (discussing how
separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, and the extended republic operate to
preserve liberty, channel conflict, and control faction); id. NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (urging
that an independent judiciary and judicial review are essential to check expansion of legislative
and executive power, and to protect individuals and groups against oppression stemming from
faction); cf. id. NO. 49 (James Madison) (arguing that constitutional questions should not be
submitted to the people because the issues would become embroiled in factional politics).
157. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 167 (remarks of Rep. Madison).

HEYMAN 6-17

2003]

6/17/03 3:55 PM

IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

561

conceptions of the meaning and scope of those rights—conceptions
that were rooted in different political beliefs, as well as different
forms of social and cultural experience. This is no less true now than
it was at the time of the founding. Inevitably, these different views
will come into conflict with each other, particularly when we come to
apply general principles to particular issues, or to new and unforeseen
circumstances.
7. Resolving conflicts—In seeking to resolve conflicts between
competing views, we must consider two different issues. On one
level, the question is which view has more support in, or represents a
more accurate view of, our own social order. On another level, the
question is which view reflects a better understanding of the value of
free speech, as well as the values with which it conflicts. In this way,
free speech cases call for complex judgments both about the nature of
our own community, and about the substantive values at stake.
8. Seeking common ground—On some issues, one position
clearly appears to be superior in its understanding of free speech and
its place within American society. At least from a modern perspective, for example, the Republican condemnation of the Sedition Act
was clearly correct. In many other contexts, however, none of the
competing ideological positions appears to have a monopoly on truth,
or to represent a fully satisfactory interpretation of the First Amendment. In such cases, ideological conflict is best resolved by seeking to
reconcile the opposing positions, and to find common ground between them, as well as between the different political, social, and
cultural groups that they represent.
This “common ground” approach is valuable for two reasons.
First, however far it may fall short of this ideal, the American constitutional order is based on the principle of consent. The legitimacy of
the Constitution depends on its acceptance by the broad majority of
the American people. As Madison discovered during the ratification
debate, in order to obtain broad acceptance, it is necessary to accommodate reasonable differences of opinion as much as possible.158
Only in this way is it possible for the Constitution to achieve one of its
principal goals: to unify diverse elements within a broader community. Second, as Mill argued, particular opinions rarely, if ever,
contain the whole truth, especially in the social and political realm.159

158. See supra Part I.B.
159. See supra text accompanying note 147.
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Instead, it is only by accepting what is most persuasive in each of the
opposing views, and rejecting what is unpersuasive, that one can form
a more comprehensive view of the truth about individual rights and
the common good.
9. The role of rights discourse—One of the most important tasks
for constitutional theory is to develop a common language within
which disputes can take place. Ideally, this language should enable
individuals to articulate divergent views in such a way that they do
not represent incommensurable discourses, but rather in such a way
that there is some basis for resolving the conflict between them—
either by determining that one view ought to prevail over another, or
by allowing for the development of common ground.
During the founding period, this function was performed by the
language of natural rights and the social contract. It was this language (among others) that Madison appealed to in order to reach an
accommodation between the Federalists, with their desire for strong
government, and the Antifederalists, with their concern for securing
the liberties of the people.160 Natural rights theory was able to
perform this function not only because it was widely accepted during
this period, but also because it was sufficiently broad and flexible to
accommodate a wide range of political views, from Blackstonian
conservatives to liberals and radicals.
In Part II, I shall argue that a theory of rights can serve a similar
function in our time, by providing a common language or framework
for ideological conflicts over the meaning of the First Amendment.
Under this approach, the different positions will be expressed in
terms of competing rights within a more comprehensive theory of
rights. To be sure, this theory will not be able to resolve all ideological conflict, for different views will continue to place differing values
on free speech and the rights with which it conflicts. Instead, my
hope is that this approach will illuminate the nature of many conflicts
over the First Amendment, and enable us to develop some common
ground between what often seem to be incommensurable views.
10. Law, politics, and culture—Insofar as debates over the meaning of the First Amendment and other constitutional provisions turn
on political, social, and cultural disagreements, they should play out
not only in the legal system but also in other institutions and the

160. See supra Part I.B.
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community at large.161 Courts should not be too quick to cut off an
ongoing political and cultural debate and impose their own views on
the subject. Yet law is an extremely important element of American
culture, and adjudication is one of the central ways that our society
addresses issues of this kind. It is not the case, then, that the courts
should refrain from deciding highly charged cultural issues. When
they do decide such cases, however, they should be aware of the
broader cultural context. They should not apply the law as though it
were a closed system that could be applied without regard to the
broader cultural issues at stake. Nor should they seek to resolve an
issue purely within a single ideological framework; instead, they
should recognize the force of arguments that are rooted in competing
positions.
11. The nature of constitutional interpretation—This discussion
has important implications for the nature of constitutional interpretation. According to the prevailing view, which has been most fully
defended by Ronald Dworkin, constitutional interpretation (and legal
interpretation in general) should ideally consist of the development
and application of a single, unified, coherent set of principles.162 On
this view, constitutional interpretation may be described as monological, in the sense that it reflects a single perspective.
As we have seen, however, the Bill of Rights did not reflect a
single, unified point of view.163 Instead, the framers sought to reconcile conflicting views. They did so by drafting the Bill of Rights in the
form of general principles and by appealing to the widely held theory
of natural rights and the social contract. At the same time, it was
inevitable that ideological debates would re-emerge when the time
came to apply general principles to concrete situations. Debates of
this sort are an essential and inescapable part of the interpretation of
the Bill of Rights.
It follows that, at least in the context of the Bill of Rights, constitutional interpretation is best viewed not as monological but as
dialectical: it involves debate, and even conflict, between competing
positions, as well as an effort to reconcile these positions within a
more comprehensive view. This account is consistent with the way in

161. This was a major theme in the work of Alexander M. Bickel. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
162. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW (1996) [hereinafter RONALD
DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW]; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
163. See supra Part I.B.
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which constitutional issues are debated (through adversarial argument), as well as the way in which they are decided (either through an
effort to build a consensus among the justices, or through the expression of disagreement in competing judicial opinions—disagreement
that is often as deep and ideological as in any other forum). This
account is also consistent with the nature of American legal education. In law, as in many other disciplines, students are taught that
truth is complex and multisided, and can be understood only by
considering differing views.
II. A CONTEMPORARY DEBATE: THE PROBLEM OF
PORNOGRAPHY
In Part I, I showed that, in an effort to achieve broad consensus,
the framers of the Bill of Rights focused on general statements of
principle, and made no effort to resolve controversial issues of scope
and application. For this reason, the First Amendment and other
provisions of the Bill of Rights have always been open to competing
interpretations—interpretations that are rooted in different political
beliefs and forms of social and cultural experience. It follows that the
meaning of the First Amendment can never been wholly separated
from ideological controversy. Instead, it is through such controversy
that the meaning of the First Amendment develops. In some cases,
resolving the controversy requires determining which of the competing views represents a better understanding of the principle of freedom of speech, as that principle is understood within the American
political, social, and cultural order. In many cases, however, no one
ideological position will fully capture our conception of free speech.
Instead, the best approach will be to take what is most persuasive in
each of the contending views, and unify them within a more comprehensive view. In a sense, this effort to seek common ground follows
the approach taken by Madison and others, who secured the adoption
of the Bill of Rights in an effort to unify different groups and views
within the community.
In the remainder of this Essay, I explore how this approach to
constitutional interpretation should apply to the classic cultural battle
in the First Amendment area: the problem of pornography. After
describing the ongoing controversy between conservatives, liberals,
feminists, and others, I argue that the language of rights can be used
to bring together these apparently incommensurable positions, in a
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way that seeks to acknowledge and incorporate what is most persuasive in each.
A.

A. Multisided Debate

In many ways, the traditional debate over obscenity parallels the
eighteenth-century debate between Blackstonian conservatives and
Jeffersonian libertarians.164 The conservative position is well represented by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v. California165 and
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,166 which reaffirmed the authority of
the States to regulate obscenity “to protect ‘the social interest in order
and morality.’”167 State legislatures, the Court contended, could
reasonably conclude that the distribution of obscene material had a
corrupting and debasing effect on individual character, as well as “a
tendency to injure the community as a whole, to endanger the public
safety, [and] to jeopardize . . . the States’ ‘right . . . to maintain a
decent society.’”168
In opposition to this conservative view, liberals argue that, under
the First Amendment, individuals should have a right to control the
content of their own expression, as well as to decide for themselves
what materials they wish to read or view.169 To be sure, many liberals
would allow the state to regulate the distribution and display of
sexually oriented materials in order to protect children and unwilling
viewers.170 From the liberal perspective, however, any broader effort
164. See supra Part I.C.
165. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
166. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
167. Id. at 61 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))) (emphasis added in Roth).
168. Id. at 69 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)). For a sophisticated defense of the conservative view, see HARRY M. CLOR, PUBLIC
MORALITY AND LIBERAL SOCIETY (1996); HARRY M. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC
MORALITY (1969).
169. See, e.g., Paris, 413 U.S. at 107–13 (Brennan, J., dissenting); RONALD DWORKIN, Do
We Have A Right to Pornography?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 335 (1985) [hereinafter Ronald
Dworkin, Right to Pornography]; 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS chs. 10–12 (1985).
170. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 496 (1970)
(arguing that exposing a person to erotic material against his wishes may cause “direct [and]
immediate” emotional harm and also “constitutes an invasion of his privacy”); FEINBERG, supra
note 169, at 189 (suggesting that pornography may be regulated only for “prevention of the
corruption of children, protection of captive audiences from offense, and the preservation of
neighborhoods from aesthetic decay”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 12–16, at 909–10 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that “obscene speech . . . is subject—as is all
speech—to regulation in the interests of unwilling viewers, captive audiences, young children,
and beleaguered neighborhoods”) (footnotes omitted); Paris, 413 U.S. at 106 (Brennan, J.,
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to suppress such materials violates the right to free expression and
represents an illegitimate attempt to impose the majority’s own moral
views on others.
Over the past two decades, the traditional debate over obscenity
has been transformed by the rise of a new perspective, which holds
that pornography should be regulated in order to prevent harm to
women.171 This position is best represented by the anti-pornography
ordinance drafted by Catharine A. MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin,
which declared pornography to be a violation of women’s civil
rights.172 At times, anti-pornography feminists have joined with
conservatives to support the regulation of pornography.173 Some
other feminists oppose the censorship of pornography, either out of
concern for freedom of expression, or on the ground that the free
circulation of sexually oriented materials tends to promote sexual
joined by Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (suggesting agreement with Emerson’s view, and
with the “view that the state interests in protecting children and . . . unconsenting adults may
stand on a different footing from the other asserted state interests”). But cf. id. at 106 & n.29
(declining to definitively address these issues until squarely presented to the Court).
171. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1979);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993) [hereinafter MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS];
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 12, chs. 11–16; PORNOGRAPHY: WOMEN,
VIOLENCE & CIVIL LIBERTIES (Catherine Itzin ed., 1992); THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE
AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY (Laura Lederer &
Richard Delgado eds., 1995) [hereinafter THE PRICE WE PAY]; Rae Langton, Speech Acts and
Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 293 (1993).
172. See MODEL ANTI-PORNOGRAPHY LAW, in Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood:
Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 24–28 (1985). The model
ordinance defined pornography as
the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures and/or words
that also includes one or more of the following: (i) women are presented dehumanized
as sexual objects, things, or commodities; or (ii) women are presented as sexual objects
who enjoy pain or humiliation; or (iii) women are presented as sexual objects who
experience sexual pleasure in being raped; or (iv) women are presented as sexual
objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or (v) women are
presented in postures or positions of sexual submission, servility, or display; (vi)
women’s body parts—including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, or buttocks—are
exhibited such that women are reduced to those parts; or (vii) women are presented as
whores by nature; or (viii) women are presented as being penetrated by objects or
animals; or (ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, torture,
shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these
conditions sexual.
Id. at 25. A version of the ordinance was enacted by the Indianapolis City Council, and was
struck down under the First Amendment in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323, 324–25 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). See infra text accompanying
notes 285–96 (discussing Hudnut).
173. See, e.g., E.R. Shipp, A Feminist Offensive Against Exploitation, N.Y. TIMES, June 10,
1984, § 4, at 2 (describing the alliance between radical feminists and conservatives that led to the
enactment of the Indianapolis ordinance). For strong criticism of such an alliance, see NADINE
STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY 77–79 (1995); Robin West, The Feminist-Conservative
Anti-Pornography Alliance and the 1986 Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography
Report, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 681.
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equality or liberation by undermining traditional moral views that
have been harmful to women.174 In this way, the opposition to
regulation comes not only from traditional liberals,175 but also from
liberal feminists and other feminists. On the other hand, support for
regulation comes from communitarians who are concerned with the
impact of pornography on communities,176 as well as from neorepublicans whose conception of freedom of speech focuses on its importance for democratic deliberation and self-government.177
B.

A Rights-Based Approach to the Problem of Pornography
1.

A Rights-Based Theory of the First Amendment

In short, conservatives, liberals, and feminists have taken sharply
divergent positions on the issue of pornography. These different
views appear incommensurable with one another. As a result, the
debate over pornography often seems deeply unsatisfactory.
In the remainder of this Essay, I want to see whether it is possible to bring these conflicting views together within the framework of
rights discourse. As we have seen, Madison took this approach in the
First Congress, when he showed that the Federalist desire for
stronger government and the Antifederalist demand for a bill of
rights could be reconciled within the framework of natural rights and
174. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist AntiCensorship Taskforce, et al., in Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986),
reprinted in 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 69 (1987–88); STROSSEN, supra note 173; Carlin Meyer,
Sex, Sin, and Women’s Liberation: Against Porn-Suppression, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (1994). For
an excellent collection of writings from all sides of the feminist debate, see FEMINISM AND
PORNOGRAPHY (Drucilla Cornell ed., 2000).
175. For some liberal critiques of the anti-pornography feminist position, see RONALD
DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 162, chs. 9–10; 2 FEINBERG, supra note 169, at 143–64.
For a thoughtful exploration of the conflict between the liberal individualist approach to the
First Amendment and a feminist approach focusing on harm to groups, see ROBERT C. POST,
Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 89 (1995).
176. See, e.g., MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 89 (1996) (maintaining that
“self-governing communities” should be permitted to restrict pornography to protect “the good
of communal respect”).
177. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589,
603 et passim (arguing that pornography should be unprotected because it causes serious social
harm, especially to women, and because it constitutes “low-value” speech, in part because it is
“far afield from the central concern of the first amendment, which, broadly speaking, is effective
popular control of public affairs”); see also Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in
American Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV.
291, 295–96, 304 (1989) (suggesting that pornography “silences women,” and that regulation
may be justified to allow full participation in democratic deliberation).
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social contract theory—a theory which was widely shared, and which
was flexible enough to accommodate a variety of political, social, and
cultural views.178 My thesis is that rights discourse can perform a
similar function in the contemporary debate over pornography, as
well as other controversial First Amendment issues.
In earlier work, I have developed a rights-based theory of the
First Amendment, drawing both on classic natural rights theory and
on our modern understanding of fundamental rights.179 According to
this view, rights are rooted in respect for persons and their capacity
for autonomy or self-determination. Personhood can be understood
on several different levels, each with a corresponding set of rights. (1)
To begin with, persons are embodied beings who exist in the external
world. As such, they have external rights to life and personal security;
to liberty of movement; and to acquire, control, and dispose of
external things. In other words, they have the traditional rights to
life, liberty, and property. (2) In addition to this external side,
persons have an inner self or personality. This gives rise to rights of
personality, which enable individuals to realize and express themselves and to interact with others. Among other things, individuals
have a right to be free from unjustified psychic injuries, such as those
covered by the torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; a right to privacy, which allows the individual to
develop a rich inner life, free from unjustified interference by others;
and a right to reputation, which constitutes the social aspect of
personality. (3) Human beings have rights not merely as independent
individuals, but also as members of society. These rights of community include the right to belong to the society and to participate in its
political, social, and cultural life. (4) As intellectual and spiritual
beings, human beings have an inherent right to freedom of thought,
belief, and expression. Finally, in all of these respects, persons are
equal to one another: thus, in addition to these four categories of
substantive rights, persons also have a right to equality.
The freedoms protected by the First Amendment can be understood in all of these ways. First, liberty of thought and speech may be
understood as external rights, that is, as part of the right to control
one’s own person. Second, freedom of thought and speech may be
viewed as rights of personality, allowing an individual to determine
her own inner life of thought and feeling and to express herself to
178. See supra Part I.B.
179. Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 86.

HEYMAN 6-17

2003]

6/17/03 3:55 PM

IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

569

others. Third, expression is one of the most important ways in which
individuals participate in the political process, as well as in the social
and cultural life of the community. Fourth, intellectual and spiritual
freedom lie at the core of the First Amendment. In these ways, the
theory brings together and unifies the major justifications that have
been offered for freedom of expression: that it is an aspect of liberty
in general;180 that it is essential to individual autonomy and selffulfillment;181 that it is central to participation in a democratic society;182 and that it is necessary for intellectual well-being and the search
for truth.183 Finally, as the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence has
emphasized, unjustified regulations of speech also may constitute a
form of discrimination by according unequal treatment to different
speakers and ideas.184
Thus, the theory of rights that I have sketched provides strong
support for freedom of speech. At the same time, it allows us to
discern the limits of that freedom. The same principles that justify
free speech also give rise to other fundamental rights. In general,
individuals have no right to exercise their freedom of speech in a way
that violates the fundamental rights of others. Under the rights-based
approach, speech may be regulated when necessary to protect those
rights, except in cases where the value of the speech is so great that it
should be protected despite the injury that it causes.
This account of the scope and limits of free speech has a strong
basis in American constitutional history.
As we have seen,
eighteenth-century Americans regarded freedom of speech as one of
the natural rights of mankind.185 Although the scope of this right was
controversial, there was broad agreement that freedom of speech
(like all rights) was bounded by the rights of others.186 For example,
180. See, e.g., 1 CATO’S LETTERS, supra note 104, no. 62.
181. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 11; REDISH, supra note 11, ch. 1; DAVID A.J. RICHARDS,
TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION chs. 6–7 (1986); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom
of Expression, 1 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and
Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991). For a critique of autonomy-based
theories of free speech, see Susan J. Brison, The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech, 108 ETHICS
312 (1998).
182. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 141; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
183. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 137, ch. 2.
184. See, e.g., Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). For an assessment of the Court’s
content neutrality jurisprudence, see Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the
Content Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
647 (2002) [hereinafter Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy].
185. See supra Part I.B.
186. See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 86, at 1288, 1295–96.
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the principle of free speech afforded no protection to speech that
unjustifiably defamed others, in violation of the right to reputation.187
This understanding of free speech was consistent with a constitutional
order that was deeply informed by the natural rights tradition.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, natural
rights jurisprudence was eclipsed by utilitarianism, legal positivism,
sociological jurisprudence, and legal realism—theories that maintained that law was based on social needs and interests rather than on
a recognition of inherent rights.188 Under the influence of scholars
like Zechariah Chafee, free speech problems were reconceptualized
as conflicts between the social interest in free speech and other social
interests.189 But balancing of this sort afforded only unreliable
protection for freedom of speech.190 In more recent decades, we have
come once more to view free speech as a fundamental right that is
deserving of strong protection. Unfortunately, however, the revival
of rights in First Amendment jurisprudence has not extended to the
other values that may be injured by speech, such as reputation. As a
result, free speech problems have come to be understood as conflicts
between the right to free speech and various social interests. But there
is no clear way to weigh individual rights against social interests. For
this reason, modern First Amendment theory finds itself in a quandary, with no coherent framework for resolving clashes between free
speech and other values. The result is heightened ideological conflict
over the First Amendment. In debates over whether to regulate
particular forms of expression, the supporters and opponents of
regulation tend to talk past each other, taking positions that are not
merely opposed to, but incommensurable with, one another. It is
small wonder, then, that First Amendment controversies typically
generate more heat than light.
As I have argued elsewhere, a solution to these difficulties may
be found in a return to a rights-based approach to the First Amend-

187. See, e.g., Madison, Report, supra note 115, at 144 (asserting that, while the First
Amendment deprived the federal government of all jurisdiction over libel, those injured by
defamation could seek “a remedy, for their injured reputations, under the same laws, and in the
same tribunals [i.e., those of the states], which protect their lives, their liberties, and their
properties”); Tucker, supra note 131, app. at 28–30.
188. See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 86, at 1299–1301.
189. See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 31–35, 149–
50 (1941) (formulating a balancing approach to freedom of speech).
190. The balancing approach reached its nadir in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510
(1951), which upheld the convictions of Communist Party leaders under a broad balancing test.
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ment.191 By reconceptualizing many First Amendment problems as
conflicts between the right to free speech and other rights, this
approach allows us to express the competing values in more commensurable terms, and to assess the strength of each value within a
comprehensive framework based on the idea of rights.
2.

Collective Rights and the Liberal Tradition

This approach may seem promising in cases where speech impacts upon other individual rights, such as personal security or
privacy. Some feminist proposals to regulate pornography focus on
harm to particular individuals.192 For the most part, however, feminist
arguments for regulation are based on the harms that pornography is
said to cause to women as a group.193 Similarly, the conservative case
for regulation is based less on injury to individuals than on harm to
the community as a whole.194 In response, civil libertarians deny that
pornography causes such harms, or at least that they provide an
adequate justification for restricting pornography.
As I have said, my hope is that a rights-based theory of the First
Amendment can provide a common language or framework within
which to debate these competing perspectives. In order to perform
this function, however, the theory must be broad enough to accommodate the core insights of each view. In particular, the theory must
have a conception of rights that is rich enough to encompass not only
individual rights, but also rights of communities (which are central to
the conservative view) and rights of groups (which are important to
the feminist position).
At first glance, the idea of collective rights may appear to be at
odds with the liberal tradition, with its strong emphasis on individual
rights. Yet the liberal tradition has a communitarian dimension that
is generally overlooked. For example, while Locke described individuals in a state of nature as “free, equal and independent,”195 he also
191. See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 86.
192. For example, the Indianapolis ordinance included provisions making it unlawful to
coerce a person to perform in pornography; to force pornography on a person; or to assault a
person “‘in a way that is directly caused by specific pornography.’” Am. Booksellers Ass’n v.
Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325–26 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting Indianapolis ordinance), aff’d mem., 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
193. See, e.g., MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 12, at 156–57.
194. See infra text accompanying notes 304–05.
195. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, bk. II, § 95 (Peter Laslett ed.,
student ed., Cambridge University Press 1988) (3d ed. 1698) [hereinafter LOCKE,
GOVERNMENT].
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held that human beings were naturally “sociable” and destined to live
in society.196 By nature, all human beings constitute “one Community”—what Locke called the “great and natural Community” of
“Mankind.”197 Acts that injure others constitute a wrong not only to
the injured party, but also to this community.198 This is the natural
origin of both tort and criminal law.199 Because rights would not be
secure in a state of nature, individuals agree to unite into a particular
society for the preservation of their rights.200 Under the social contract, they give up some of their natural rights and transfer them to
the community.201 Thus the powers that the community has are
simply the rights that individuals have transferred to it.202 Locke
emphasizes that, through the social contract, the parties become “one
Body, One Community,” which has both the right and the duty to act
for the good of the whole.203 In this way, the people come to have
rights not only as individuals, but also as a community.204
196. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, bk. III, ch. I, § 1, at
402 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975) (4th ed. 1700). Locke writes: “GOD having
designed Man for a sociable Creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a
necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind; but furnished him also with Language,
which was to be the great Instrument, and common Tye of Society.” Id.; see also LOCKE,
GOVERNMENT, supra note 195, bk. II, § 77 (making a similar point). This account of language
suggests that, rather than understanding speech in strictly individualist terms, Locke believed
that speech was essential to human community—a view that traces back to Aristotle’s Politics.
According to Aristotle, “man is by nature a political animal” because man “has speech.”
Speech “serves to reveal . . . [what is] good and bad and just and unjust . . . and partnership in
these things is what makes a household and a city [polis].” ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. 1, ch. 2,
1253a1-18 (Carnes Lord trans., 1984).
197. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 195, bk. II, § 128.
198. See id. § 8.
199. See id. §§ 10–11.
200. See id. §§ 123–31.
201. See id. §§ 87, 128–30.
202. See id. § 135; see also WOOD, CREATION, supra note 103, at 24 (observing that, in
eighteenth-century Whig political theory, “[p]ublic liberty was . . . the combining of each man’s
individual liberty into a collective governmental authority, the institutionalization of the
people’s personal liberty, making public or political liberty equivalent to democracy or
government by the people themselves”).
203. LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 195, bk. II, § 96.
204. Clear insight into this point may be derived from a close reading of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights, which draws a consistent distinction between the rights of individuals and
the collective rights of the people. See MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 7. Among other collective rights, the people are said to have
“the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign, and independent
State,” id. art. IV; the inalienable right to institute or reform the government, id. art. VIII; the
right to freely elect public officers, id. arts. VIII–IX; the right to be subject only to those laws or
taxes made with “the consent of the people, or their representatives in the legislature,” id. arts.
X, XXIII; and the “right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon the
common good,” and to petition the legislature for redress, id. art. XIX. For further analysis of
the Massachusetts Declaration and its distinction between individual and collective rights, see
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This is not the place for a full exploration of the notion of collective rights in American constitutionalism. It is important to observe,
however, that free speech itself has traditionally been understood in
part as a right of the community as a whole. As I have noted, in the
eighteenth-century libertarian tradition, free speech was not only an
inalienable right of individuals, it was also a right that the people as a
whole retained when they established a government—a right that was
essential if they were to supervise the government and to exercise
their own political rights within a representative system.205 Similarly,
free speech is understood in terms of public freedom in one of the
leading modern theories of free speech: the Meiklejohnian view that
the First Amendment protects discourse essential to democratic selfgovernment206—a view that has had a powerful impact on the Supreme Court’s understanding of the First Amendment.207
Thus far, we have been discussing collective rights belonging to
the community as a whole. Do other groups also have rights? Of
course, the law recognizes rights of voluntary associations. But the
question here is whether there are rights that belong to other sorts of
groups, such as those defined by race, ethnicity, religion, or gender.
The question of group rights in the liberal state is a complex and
multifaceted one.208 One point is clear, however: liberalism recognizes a right to be free from mistreatment because of group membership. Once more, this idea has deep roots in American constitutional
history. As we have seen, a central theme of The Federalist No. 10
was the need to prevent majorities from oppressing minorities.209 For
Madison, a classic case of such oppression was that directed against
Steven J. Heyman, Natural Rights and the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 237, 260–
63, 284–90 (2000).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 107–09 (discussing Cato’s Letters).
206. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 141.
207. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); William J. Brennan, Jr.,
The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1965); Kalven, supra note 91, at 209.
208. There is a rich and growing literature on the subject. See, e.g., ETHNICITY AND GROUP
RIGHTS (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997); GROUP RIGHTS (Judith Baker ed., 1994);
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM ch. 8 (1986); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976); Ronald R. Garet, Communality and
Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001 (1983); Leslie Green, Two Views of
Collective Rights, 4 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 315 (1991); Peter Jones, Group Rights and Group
Oppression, 7 J. POL. PHIL. 353 (1999); James Morauta, Rights and Participatory Goods, 22
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 91 (2002); Denise Réaume, Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public
Goods, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1988); JEREMY WALDRON, Can Communal Goods Be Human
Rights?, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS, 1981–1991 (1993).
209. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 13, at 80–81, 83–84 (James Madison).
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religious minorities.210 Similarly, in a speech during the Constitutional
Convention, Madison observed that “the mere distinction of colour”
had been made “a ground of the most oppressive dominion ever
exercised by man over man.”211 Of course, the idea that people
should not be mistreated on the basis of group membership lies at the
heart of the Fourteenth Amendment and of modern equal protection
doctrine.
As I will suggest below, it is largely in this sense that pornography affects groups. Rather than being a violation of any special rights
belonging to group members, some sorts of pornography (in particular, pornography that depicts violence against women) may be
regarded as violating rights that belong to all human beings.212 To put
it another way, what is at stake is not so much group-based rights as
group-based wrongs, that is, injuries inflicted on people who belong
to a particular group.
3.

Conclusion

Under the rights-based approach, freedom of expression is a
fundamental right. Like all rights, however, free speech must be
exercised with due respect for the rights of others. When speech
infringes those rights, it may be regulated by law unless the value of
the speech is so great that it justifies the infringement. Speech also
may be regulated in cases where it does not constitute a fundamental
right.
To determine whether pornography should receive constitutional
protection, then, we should ask the following questions. (1) Does the
liberty to make, distribute, and view pornography fall within the
fundamental right to freedom of expression? If not, then this liberty
is subject to regulation for the common good, like other ordinary
forms of liberty. On the other hand, if this liberty is fundamental,
then it may be restricted only to protect the rights of others. (2) That
leads to the second inquiry: Does pornography violate the rights of
others? If not, it should be protected under the First Amendment.
(3) If a particular sort of pornography does violate other rights, then
210. See, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
(June 20, 1785), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at 82; Letter from
Madison to Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), supra note 39, at 564; Speech of James Madison in the
Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 35, at 330.
211. See Remarks of Mr. Madison (June 6, 1787), in 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 13, at 135.
212. See infra Part III.
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balancing is in order to determine the relative force of the conflicting
rights. If the value of the speech outweighs that of the other right,
then the speech should be regarded as privileged under the First
Amendment. Otherwise, the speech should be subject to regulation
to protect the other right.
In the following section (Part II.C), I will argue that, prima facie,
the fundamental right to freedom of expression does extend to
pornography. The remainder of the Essay will explore whether
pornography should be held unprotected on the ground that it
violates the rights of others. In Part III, I consider whether, as radical
feminists claim, pornography violates the rights of women; and if so,
whether it should nevertheless be protected under the First Amendment. In Part IV, I discuss the conservative contention that pornography affects the rights of the community. In particular, I explore
whether certain sorts of pornography violate the basic principles of
the community; whether the community should have a right to
exclude pornographic material from public places, or to shield
children from exposure to pornography; and whether the community
may decline to subsidize speech that violates its standards of decency.
C.

Does Pornography Fall Within the Fundamental Right to
Freedom of Expression?

In this Essay, I shall use the term “pornography” in a broad
sense to refer to all material whose predominant purpose is to stimulate or satisfy the sexual desires of its audience. Under the rightsbased approach, the threshold question is whether material of this
sort falls within the fundamental freedoms of speech and press
protected by the First Amendment.
Writing for the majority in Roth v. United States,213 Justice Brennan declared that obscene materials “were utterly without redeeming
social importance” because they did nothing to advance the purpose
of the First Amendment: “[T]o assure unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.”214 Balancing the social interests involved, the Court concluded that obscene materials should receive no constitutional
protection, for they were “of such slight social value as a step to truth

213. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
214. Id. at 484.
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that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.”215
In contrast to Roth, the rights-based theory holds that freedom of
expression has intrinsic as well as instrumental value: free speech is
not merely a means to promote social welfare, but also an inherent
right. In addition to allowing citizens to participate in democratic
deliberation—a value that Brennan more fully developed in New
York Times v. Sullivan216—this right is also rooted in other values,
including individual autonomy and self-realization. As the Court has
come to recognize, the First Amendment protects the individual’s
“autonomy to choose the content of his own [speech],”217 as well as
“the right to read or observe what he pleases.”218 And free speech
serves not only “[t]o permit the continued building of our politics and
culture,” but also “to assure self-fulfillment for each individual.”219
If these are the values that underlie the First Amendment, it is
difficult to see how pornography can be excluded from its scope. The
choice to make or view pornography falls within the notion of individual autonomy—the right to determine the content of one’s own
expression and to decide for oneself what to see or hear. In addition,
some individuals derive self-fulfillment from pornography.220 Moreover, while the acts of making and viewing pornography may contribute little to democratic deliberation, they do influence the society and
its culture. (Indeed, this is one of the main concerns that motivate the
regulation of pornography.)221 Thus, these acts may be regarded as a
form of participation in, or shaping of, the social and cultural life of

215. Id. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) (emphasis
added by Roth omitted).
216. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
217. Hurley v. Irish–Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
573–74 (1995).
218. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
219. Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972).
220. This is not necessarily to say that the self-fulfillment to be derived from pornography is
of great value. Although an individual may derive physical and psychic pleasure from the use of
pornography, this experience does little to satisfy what may be the deepest aspect of sexual
desire—the desire to enter into relations with another person. See infra text accompanying note
263. For present purposes, however, the quality of this fulfillment is beside the point. As Mill
observes, freedom consists of the right to pursue one’s own good in one’s own way, so long as
one refrains from injuring others. MILL, supra note 137, at 14. If one does injure others,
however, the value of the activity is relevant to determining whether it should be protected
despite the injury that it causes. See infra Part III.B.
221. See infra text accompanying notes 304–05.
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the community.222 Finally, the search for truth does not take place
only on a social level. Instead, the individual’s pursuit of selfknowledge constitutes an important aspect of the search for truth.223
It has been persuasively argued that, for some people—especially
sexual minorities—pornography can play an important role in promoting self-knowledge.224
III. PORNOGRAPHY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN
For these reasons, I believe that pornography falls within the
fundamental right to freedom of speech. Under a rights-based
approach to the First Amendment, the next question is whether this
form of expression violates the rights of others. In this Part, I consider whether pornography infringes the rights of women; and if so,
whether this injury is outweighed by the value of the speech. Part IV
discusses whether the community as a whole has rights that justify
regulation of pornography.
A. Does Pornography Infringe the Rights of Women?
In an earlier section I sketched a general theory of rights that was
informed by the natural rights tradition as well as by our modern
understanding of rights.225 According to this view, rights are rooted in
respect for persons and their capacity for autonomy or selfdetermination. Human beings have several categories of rights: (1)
external rights to life, liberty, and property; (2) rights of personality,
including privacy, reputation, and freedom from unjustified infliction
of emotional distress; (3) rights to belong to the community, and to
participate in its political, social, and cultural life; and (4) intellectual
and spiritual freedom. In addition to these substantive rights, human
beings have a right to equality.
All of these rights are inherent in personhood. Yet it is impossible for a person to possess and enjoy these rights unless she is recognized as such. Thus, the most fundamental of all rights is the right to
recognition as a person, with all the rights that flow from this status.

222. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 11, at 121 (suggesting that the protection of unconventional forms of speech and conduct may contribute to the process of social change).
223. See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 86, at 1350–51.
224. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Sherman, Love Speech: The Social Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 661 (1995).
225. See supra Part II.B.1.
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As I have shown elsewhere, this notion of recognition was implicit in
the natural rights theory that influenced the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights.226 The right to recognition also lies at the heart of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,227 which repudiated the
declaration of Dred Scott that (whether slave or free) blacks were
“beings of an inferior order” who “had no rights which the white man
was bound to respect,”228 and which instead recognized all human
beings within the jurisdiction of the United States as persons with
rights.
1.

The Right to Recognition

We are now in a position to explore the question of whether pornography violates the rights of women. According to MacKinnon and
Dworkin, pornography is a form of sex discrimination, which subordinates women and denies them equality. This denial of equality is
not merely a matter of treating women less favorably than men, or
even of according women inferior status and power in society.
Instead, at the most fundamental level, the radical feminist claim is
that pornography denies women recognition by treating them not as
human beings, but as mere sexual objects.229
In my view, this is not true of all forms of pornography. To represent a woman as a sex object is not necessarily to represent her as a
mere sex object rather than a person. In this way the radical feminist
claim seems too broad. And the same is true of any definition of
pornography that would include all material that portrays women as
sex objects.230

226. See Steven J. Heyman, Hate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, in HATE
SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION ix, xli–xlii, xlviii–l (Steven J. Heyman ed., 1996) [hereinafter
Heyman, Hate Speech].
227. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV.
228. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856) (opinion of Taney, C.J.) (stating that, at the
time of the founding, blacks “had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political
relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect;
and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit”).
229. See, e.g., MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 12, at 158–61 (discussing
the ways in which pornography dehumanizes women); Andrea Dworkin, supra note 172, at 15–
16 (same).
230. The MacKinnon-Dworkin anti-pornography ordinance is susceptible of this interpretation, insofar as it extends to sexually explicit material that shows women in “postures or
positions of sexual submission, servility, or display.” See supra note 172 (quoting model
ordinance).
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Nevertheless, I believe that the radical feminist claim contains an
essential core of truth. Some pornography does represent women as
mere sex objects and not as persons. In particular, this is true of
violent pornography—pornography that portrays women being
abused, raped, tortured, or killed, in a way that is intended to be
sexually appealing to the viewer.231 Representing women in this way
does violate the right to recognition.
This is clearly true in the case of pornography that represents a
specific woman in this way. In one notorious case, for example, a
student at the University of Michigan wrote, and posted to the
Internet, a pornographic story describing in horrific detail how he
wished to sexually torture, rape, and murder one of his classmates—a
woman whom he identified by name.232 Surely, this act of speech
violated the woman’s rights by representing her in a way wholly
inconsistent with her dignity as a human being.233
Of course, the Michigan case is highly unusual. Most works of
violent pornography portray the infliction of such acts on fictional
characters rather than on real individuals. Such works may employ
women as actresses, however. According to MacKinnon, women
often are coerced into performing in pornographic films, and the
violence that is done to them often is real, not simulated.234 Of
course, insofar as this is true, pornography presents an easy case: no
one would deny that to coerce an individual in this way, or to inflict
actual violence on her, is wrongful, nor would anyone claim that the
First Amendment’s protections extend to such conduct. The difficult
problem arises only when a work of violent pornography is fictional,
and is made without coercion or violence against real individuals. In
such a case, the work does not seem to deny recognition to the
individual women involved in its production.
231. Some of the arguments that I shall make in this Part also have a bearing on the
category of nonviolent but degrading pornography. For discussions of this category, see Butler
v. Regina, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 484–85 (Can.); 1 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON
PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 329–35 (1986) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
COMMISSION REPORT]. This category is, however, more controversial and more difficult to
define than violent pornography. See, e.g., West, supra note 173, at 705–06 (criticizing the way
this category is defined in the Attorney General’s Commission Report). For purposes of clarity,
my discussion in this Part will focus on violent pornography.
232. See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Baker,
890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995). The story is reproduced in Judge Krupansky’s dissenting
opinion in Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1497–98 n.1.
233. For a brief analysis of this case, see Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 86, at
1277–78, 1391–92.
234. See, e.g., MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS, supra note 171, at 3–5, 10–12, 15.
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I believe, however, that a strong argument can be made that violent pornography is wrongful in that it violates the right to recognition of women in general. This argument rests on the following
contentions. First, what is represented in pornography is not merely
the image of this woman (the individual who performs in a film), but
also the image of women in general—the physical features that
characterize female sexuality. This is what the viewer desires to see,
and what the producer seeks to provide. Although a pornographic
work also may represent a woman as having some personality or
other individuating characteristics, as a rule this is strictly secondary
to the portrayal of her body, which is attractive precisely because, and
insofar as, it displays these female characteristics.
Second, the image of women in general is something that is
shared by all women. Thus, representations that are contained in
pornography implicitly refer not only to the particular woman who is
portrayed, but also to women in general and to all members of the
group.
Third, as I have argued above, violent pornography infringes the
rights of those it portrays to recognition as human beings. The
conclusion to which we are led is that violent pornography infringes
women’s fundamental right to recognition.235
Clearly, the notion of groups plays an essential role in this argument. But it is important to consider exactly how it does so. The
argument does not rest on an assertion that women as a group have
235. A deeper understanding of the problem of pornography can be derived from Hegel’s
account of recognition and the development of self-consciousness. See, e.g., 3 G.W.F. HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT §§ 424–37 (M.J. Petry ed., 1978) (Part II of Hegel’s
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences). For Hegel, the development of self-consciousness
begins with desire. The subject asserts itself in relation to external objects by possessing and
consuming them, and thereby making them its own. See id. §§ 427–28. Thus, desire “is
generally destructive in its satisfaction, just as it is generally self-seeking in respect of its
content.” Id. § 428. When the subject comes face to face with another self, it finds its self-hood
threatened. See id § 430. This gives rise to a struggle for recognition, in which each party seeks
to assert his own superiority, and to destroy or dominate the other. See id. §§ 431–33.
According to Hegel, this struggle can be resolved only through mutual recognition, a condition
of “reciprocity” in which each one knows itself in the other self. Id. § 436. Such recognition
becomes the basis of “[u]niversal self-consciousness” and “reason.” Id. §§ 436–37.
This account throws considerable light on both pornography and hate speech. Hate speech
may be understood to correspond to the stage in which the subject, threatened by the selfhood
of others, denies them recognition and seeks to annihilate them. Pornography, on the other
hand, corresponds to the stage of desire: it represents those it portrays as objects for the
satisfaction of the viewer’s sexual desires, that is, as a sex object. As I have suggested, to
represent someone as a sex object is not necessarily to view her solely as an object. See supra
text accompanying note 230. But violent pornography represents another solely as an object to
be consumed and even destroyed. In this way, it denies those whom it portrays recognition as
human beings.
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some special rights that others do not have. Instead, the argument is
predicated upon the fundamental right of all human beings to recognition and dignity. The thrust of the argument is that, in the case of
violent pornography, this right is being denied to all of the members
of a particular group. To put it another way, what is at issue here is
not so much a group right as a group-based wrong. We may describe
this either as a wrong to women as a class, or as a wrong to all of the
individuals who belong to the class. In either case, the basic point is
that an injury is being done to a class of people on the basis of group
membership. In this way, the argument is analogous to a claim that
the government or a private party is discriminating against all the
members of a group on the basis of race, religion, gender, or other
invidious grounds, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause or the
civil rights laws—provisions that also protect people against injury
based on group status. For these reasons, I believe that the way in
which the idea of groups is used in the argument is consonant with a
broad understanding of liberal constitutional theory.
2.

Rights of Personality

Because violent pornography infringes the right to recognition—
which lies at the foundation of all other rights—it is hardly surprising
that such material also has an impact on other rights of women,
including their rights of personality and personal security.
As we have seen, the traditional rights of life, liberty, and property protect the external interests of individuals. But these rights are
ultimately rooted in the view that individuals are not merely external
beings, but that they also have inner selves with the capacity for selfdetermination. Respect for this aspect of the self gives rise to the
rights of personality. In addition to free speech, this category includes several other rights. First is the right to be free from unjustified psychic injuries, such as those covered by the torts of intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Second is the right to
privacy, which protects the boundary between the inner life of the
individual and the external world. Third is what I shall call the right
to one’s image. Human beings relate to one another only on the basis
of the images that they have of each other. Thus a person’s image
may be said to constitute her social personality, or her personality in
relation to others. The right to one’s image includes several specific
rights under the common law: the right to reputation; the right not to
be placed in a false light before the public; and the right to control the
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use of one’s name and likeness. More generally, the right to one’s
image should be taken to include all legitimate claims that an individual has with respect to the way that she is portrayed by others.236
Are these rights of personality infringed by pornography? It is
easy to see how this could be true of pornography that portrays a
particular woman without her consent. A striking example is provided by Boyles v. Kerr,237 in which the defendant secretly videotaped
a sexual encounter with his girlfriend and then screened the video at
his fraternity house.238 Arguably, this conduct violated all of the
personality rights that I have mentioned: it constituted intentional or
reckless, as well as negligent, infliction of emotional distress; it
invaded the woman’s privacy, both by intruding into her private life
and by exposing it to others; it appropriated her likeness without her
consent; and finally, it may have injured her reputation and placed
her in a false light. In all these ways, the conduct clearly was wrongful.
Once again, however, this does not seem to be true of all forms
of pornography. If a pornographic work is made with the consent of
the individuals who are portrayed, it would not seem to violate their
rights. And while (as I argued above) pornography may be taken to
portray not only those individuals but also women in general, the way
in which it portrays them is not necessarily wrongful.
Again, however, the case is different with regard to violent pornography. In particular, I would argue that such pornography violates the right of women in general to their image. To see this point,
it is necessary to explore the nature of personality.239
On one level, each person is unique. Yet every individual also
has some characteristics that she shares with others. The most basic
of these is her status as a human being. Indeed, it is on the basis of
this status that she is entitled to human rights. In addition, each
individual possesses many other characteristics in common with
others, such as race, nationality, religion, gender, and so on. Thus, to

236. For a fuller exploration of rights of personality, see Heyman, Righting the Balance,
supra note 86, at 1323–44. The notion of social personality and the right to one’s image are
discussed in id. at 1336–40.
237. 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
238. See id. at 594.
239. The following view of personality as a unity of the general and the particular is drawn
in part from Hegel’s account of the will. See G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY
OF RIGHT §§ 5–7 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) [hereinafter HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT].
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give a full account of an individual’s personality, we must include not
only what makes her unique, but also the general characteristics that
constitute part of her identity. And if this is true of an individual’s
personality in general, it is also true of her social personality or image.
It follows that an individual’s image includes not only what is
unique to her, but also the view that is commonly held of the characteristics that she shares with others, such as gender. As I have argued,
however, what is represented in pornography includes the image of
women in general, and violent pornography portrays this image in a
way that is inconsistent with human dignity. It follows that violent
pornography violates the rights of women in general to their image.
This wrong can be understood in two somewhat different ways.
One is to say that violent pornography violates the right of each
individual woman to her own image—an image that includes, as one
of its constituent elements, the image of women in general. Alternatively, we could say that because the specific right at issue—the right
to that part of one’s image that constitutes the image of women in
general—is one that is held in common by all the members of the
group, the right is best understood as a group right, that is, a right that
is held by the group itself.240 The first formulation is more consistent
with a liberal, individualist view, while the second is more in accord
with a view that focuses on group identity. Whichever formulation
one prefers, however, the basic point is the same—violent pornography portrays women in a way that is inconsistent with human dignity,
and in this way violates their rights to their image. Such pornography
also tends to inflict unjustified psychic injury on women, at least in
situations where they are exposed to such material without their
consent.241
3.

The Right to Personal Security

Thus far, we have been focusing on the claim that violent pornography inflicts dignitary injury on women. But radical feminists
also argue that pornography injures women in another way, by
240. Compare, e.g., RAZ, supra note 208, at 207–09 (viewing rights to collective goods as
collective rights), and WALDRON, supra note 208 (same), and Réaume, supra note 208 (same),
with Morauta, supra note 208 (challenging this view).
241. See, e.g., DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN: ABORTION,
PORNOGRAPHY & SEXUAL HARASSMENT 103–05, 147–58 (1995). Although Cornell generally
would protect pornography, she would allow regulation of public display on the ground that
forced viewing of pornography assaults one’s self-respect by showing one’s gender as an “object
of violation” that is “unworthy of personhood.” Id. at 147–49.
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promoting sexual assault and other forms of abuse.242 In the language
that I am using, the claim is that pornography undermines the right to
personal security or immunity from violence—one of the most
fundamental rights that people possess.
In assessing this claim, it is important once again to distinguish
between different forms of pornography. The claim that pornography
in general promotes violence against women may be too broad.243 As
applied to violent pornography, on the other hand, it may well have
some force. As I have said, violent pornography portrays women not
as human beings with rights, but as mere objects that can be violated,
abused, or even killed, and it presents this violence in an erotically
powerful way. It is reasonable to suppose that material of this kind
has a tendency to promote violence against women, by stimulating or
reinforcing viewers’ desires to commit violence, while weakening
their moral and psychological inhibitions against doing so. This view
finds support in some social science research that suggests that
“exposure to violent pornography [tends to] increase aggression
against women.”244 This evidence is far from conclusive, however,245
242. See, e.g., MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 12, at 184–89.
243. See, e.g., Michelle Chernikoff Anderson, Speaking Freely About Reducing Violence
Against Women: A Harm Reduction Strategy from the Law and Social Science of Pornography,
10 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 173, 187 (1998) (citing studies suggesting that “nonviolent and
nondegrading sexually explicit materials appear unrelated to violence against women”).
244. EDWARD DONNERSTEIN ET AL., THE QUESTION OF PORNOGRAPHY xi (1987). As the
authors explain, “there are good theoretical reasons to assume that exposure to violent
pornography will increase aggression against women[,]” and “the research has borne out these
assumptions.” Id. They summarize these reasons as follows:
First, the antisocial effects—for example, the imitation of aggressive behavior and
desensitization to violence—that researchers have found for individuals who observe
mass media violence on television are expected to occur when this violence is presented within a sexual context. But aggressive pornography may be more potent than
televised violence because it pairs both sex and violence. Coupling of sex and aggression in violent pornography may result in a conditioning process. Aggressive acts
become associated with sexual acts in the viewers’ minds. The result of this conditioning process would be that viewers become sexually aroused by violence. Several researchers already believe that this conditioning process is responsible for rapist
behavior.
Id. at 92 (citing several works by Neil Malamuth and others) (additional citation omitted). In
addition, frequent exposure to violent pornography may increase male viewers’ acceptance of
“the myth that women enjoy rape,” and encourage men to believe that they will not be caught if
they commit rape. Id. (citations omitted).
For some summaries of the research that tends to support these hypotheses, see id. at 91–
107; Anderson, supra note 243, at 183–91; Diana E.H. Russell, Pornography and Rape: A Causal
Model, in FEMINISM AND PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 174, at 48. As Donnerstein et al. make
clear, the negative effects of depictions of sexual violence are not limited to violent pornography, but also result from materials that are violent but not sexually explicit, such as “slasher”
movies. See DONNERSTEIN ET AL., supra, at 108–36.
245. In particular, researchers do not yet “know if repeated exposure to violent pornography has a cumulative effect in producing aggression, or if such effects are only temporary.”
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and the question whether violent pornography leads to increased
violence against women remains a deeply controversial one.246
This is not the only important question, however. For personal
security includes not only the right to be free from violence, but also
the right to feel secure against violence.247 For example, the law
protects personal security against assaults and threats of violence,
even when they do not involve or lead to actual violence.248
Whether or not it can be convincingly shown that violent pornography actually causes violence, a reasonable argument can be made
that it impinges upon the right to feel secure against violence.249 Of
course, to feel such security, one must believe that one is reasonably
safe from harm. But the sense of security runs much deeper than
that. It consists in a sense of trust in others, rooted in the belief that
they recognize oneself as a person with a right to immunity from
violence. But violent pornography denies such recognition to women,
and instead portrays violence against them as desirable and acceptable. Insofar as those who make or consume such pornography
DONNERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 244, at 100. Even more importantly, while many studies have
found that male subjects who are exposed to violent pornography show increased levels of
aggression against females in laboratory settings, it is controversial whether the same holds true
in the real world. See id. at 174. For discussion of the limitations of the social science research
in this area, see William A. Fisher & Guy Grenier, Violent Pornography, Antiwoman Thoughts,
and Antiwoman Acts: In Search of Reliable Effects, 31 J. SEX RES. 23 (1994); Daniel Linz et al.,
The Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography: The Gaps Between “Findings” and Facts,
1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 713; Frederick Schauer, Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual
Violence, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 737, 754–60, 763–67.
246. For a sampling of the debate, see MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note
12, at 184–86, 186–89; Anthony D’Amato, A New Political Truth: Exposure to Sexually Violent
Materials Causes Sexual Violence, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 575 (1990); Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic, Pornography and Harm to Women: “No Empirical Evidence?”, 53 OHIO ST. L.J.
1037 (1992); David A.J. Richards, Pornography Commissions and the First Amendment: On
Constitutional Values and Constitutional Facts, 39 ME. L. REV. 275, 301–09 (1987); Nadine
Strossen, A Feminist Critique of “The” Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099,
1176–85 (1993); Sunstein, supra note 177, at 597–601; Symposium on the Attorney General’s
Commission on Pornography, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 639. Much of this debate was
sparked by the 1986 Report of the Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography, which
concluded that the available evidence strongly supported a causal link between sexually violent
materials and sexual violent acts. See 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 231, at 323–29.
247. See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 86, at 1320. For the liberal tradition, this
sense of security is a fundamental aspect of liberty. As Montesquieu puts it, “Political liberty in
a citizen is that tranquillity of spirit which comes from the opinion that each one has of his
security, and in order for him to have this liberty the government must be such that one citizen
cannot fear another citizen.” MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS pt. 2, bk. 11, ch. 6, at
157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. trans. & eds., Cambridge University Press, 1989) (Oeuvres
Completes ed., 1758).
248. See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 86, at 1323–24.
249. I am grateful to Susan Williams for suggesting this line of argument.
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accept the view that it presents, they do not recognize women as
persons with a right to freedom from violence. It is reasonable for
women not to trust such individuals to respect their right to bodily
security. In this way, by violating the right to recognition, violent
pornography also tends to undermine women’s right to security
against violence. This effect does not seem powerful enough, standing alone, to make the pornography wrongful. But it does reinforce
the other reasons for reaching this conclusion.
4.

The Right to Equality

Up to this point, we have been exploring the impact that violent
pornography has on the substantive rights of women—rights of
recognition, personality, and personal security. Now I want to show
that rights theory also lends support to the radical feminist claim that
such pornography subordinates women and denies them equality.
In modern thought, equality and substantive rights (such as liberty) are often seen as distinct from—and even opposed to—one
another. In classical liberal thought, by contrast, these two kinds of
rights were regarded as two sides of the same coin.250 From a substantive perspective, human beings have a right to recognition as persons,
with all the rights that derive from this status.251 Because all human
beings are the same in this respect, they are obligated to recognize
and treat one another as equals who are entitled to the same rights.252
According to Locke, this fundamental principle of equality would be
violated by any effort to impose domination or “[s]ubordination” on
others, by treating them as though they were mere “inferior” beings
who were “made for [our own] uses” rather than “equal and independent” persons.253
As we have seen, by treating women as mere sexual objects who
can be used or even “destroy[ed]” at the “[p]leasure” of others,254
violent pornography denies them recognition as human beings. In
this way, it violates the right to equality. This right is also violated
250. See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 195, bk. II, §§ 4, 6 (describing the state of
nature as one of “perfect Freedom” and “Equality”); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS *237(Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge University Press 1991) (explaining that the most
fundamental human right, that of freedom, includes within it an “innate [right to] equality” and
other rights “which are not really distinct from it,” but rather implicit in it).
251. See supra Part III.A.1.
252. See LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 195, bk. II, §§ 4, 6.
253. Id. bk. II, § 6.
254. Id.
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insofar as violent pornography infringes women’s substantive rights
on the basis of gender.
B.

Are These Infringements Outweighed by the Value of the Speech?
1.

Violent Pornography in General

In the preceding section, I argued that violent pornography infringes the rights of women in several ways—by denying them recognition as human beings, inflicting injury to personality, threatening
personal security, and undermining equality. This is not the end of
the analysis, however. Under the rights-based approach, speech
sometimes should be protected despite the injury that it causes to
other rights. A classic example is New York Times v. Sullivan,255
which held that speech regarding the conduct of government officials
was so central to the democratic process that it should receive First
Amendment protection so long as it was made in good faith, even if it
turned out to be false and damaging to an individual’s reputation. In
that situation, the value of the speech outweighed the injury to other
rights.256 The question is whether this is also true of violent pornography.
As I suggested above, the strongest argument for extending some
First Amendment protection to pornography is that it promotes selffulfillment for some individuals.257 An opponent of regulation might
say, then, that even if violent pornography infringes women’s rights,
this injury is outweighed by the contribution that it makes to the selffulfillment of those who produce or consume it.
This argument is unconvincing for several reasons. First, the balancing of rights that I have described is subject to a crucial constraint:
an alleged right can derive no value from its negation of another
right.258 For example, if personal security is a right, then threats of
violence are wrongful, and this conclusion cannot be overcome
merely by asserting that one enjoys causing others to fear for their
safety. Similarly, if individuals have a right to reputation, this right
cannot be defeated simply by arguing that one derives fulfillment
from defaming them. In short, speech or conduct that infringes
255.
256.
257.
258.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 279–80.
See supra Part II.C.
See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 86, at 1356.
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another right cannot be privileged on account of the very reason that
makes the speech or conduct wrongful in the first place, but only
because it promotes some other value (such as the value of democratic self-government in New York Times).
The implications of this point should be clear. If individuals derive fulfillment from viewing violent pornography, this fulfillment
must derive either from what is distinctive to such pornography (the
portrayal of violence), or from what is not distinctive to it. In the
latter case, there is no reason to protect violent pornography, because
the fulfillment can be derived in ways that do not violate the rights of
other people. On the other hand, if the fulfillment derives from what
is distinctive to violent pornography, this must be due to the fact that
it portrays women in a violent and degrading way. But this is precisely what makes the pornography wrongful in the first place.
It follows that even if some viewers obtain fulfillment from violent pornography, this cannot count as a reason to protect it. Some
analogies should make the point crystal clear. No one would argue
that an individual’s right to be free from rape should be balanced
against the pleasure that a rapist might derive from it. If individuals
have a right to be free from compelled sex, then the desire to force
sex on another is wrongful in itself and cannot count as a reason to
protect the conduct. To do so would be to allow an act to be justified
by the very thing that makes it wrongful in the first place. This point
is not limited to physical wrongs but extends to dignitary ones as well.
Thus, no one would argue that an individual’s right to privacy should
be balanced against the pleasure that a voyeur might take in invading
it. The same is true of violent pornography: if it violates women’s
rights, then the fact that some individuals derive pleasure from that
violation cannot count as a reason to protect it.
On one level, this discussion merely underlines the idea that individuals have no right to pursue self-fulfillment in a way that depends on denying the legitimate self-fulfillment of others. But one
may also question the value of the fulfillment that can be derived
from violent pornography. As I have suggested, the self is a unity of
the general and the particular: the self consists not only of what
makes a particular individual unique, but also of those general
qualities she shares with others.259 The most basic of these qualities is
the individual’s humanity. In turn, one of the most fundamental
259. See supra Part III.A.2.
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aspects of humanity is the requirement that one recognize the humanity of others. But violent pornography disrespects the humanity of
others, and therefore is at odds with the individual’s own humanity.
While viewing violent pornography may satisfy the particular desires
of an individual, it does so only at the expense of another, deeper
aspect of self-fulfillment, that is, the realization of one’s nature as a
human being. For this reason, the value of violent pornography for
self-fulfillment is at best deeply ambivalent.
To put the point in a different way, the self has not only an individual but also a social side. As Mill observes, on balance, rules that
require individuals to respect the rights of others do not undermine
human development, but rather promote it.260 Of course, such rules
are necessary to protect the capacity of others to engage in selfdevelopment.261 And while such rules may limit an individual’s ability
to gratify his own desires, he receives “a full equivalent in the better
development of the social part of his nature, rendered possible by the
restraint put upon the selfish part,” for such restraints tend to “develop[] the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for
their object.”262
Finally, the self-fulfillment argument is unconvincing for another
reason—one that has to do with the nature of sexual freedom and
desire. Unlike some other kinds of desire, such as hunger or thirst,
sexual desire is not (at least characteristically) a desire for a nonhuman object, but a desire for another human being. In other words,
sexual desire is relational—it is a desire to enter into relations with
another person. Similarly, the right to seek the fulfillment of one’s
sexual desires through relations with another person is what may be
called a relational right—a right to interact with others in a certain
way, or to participate in a common activity or good.263 As a relational
right, it must be exercised in a way that is consistent with the rights of
the other participants.264 It follows that the idea of sexual freedom
does not include a right to fulfill one’s desires in a way that violates
the rights of other persons who are the objects of those desires. Once
again, this is clear in the case of rape and invasion of privacy. It is
also true of violent pornography, which portrays women collectively
260. MILL, supra note 137, at 60.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 86, at 1347–48 (discussing concept of a
relational right).
264. See id.
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in a way that is inconsistent with their fundamental rights to dignity
and recognition.265
For these reasons, we may conclude that violent pornography in
general does not have sufficient value to outweigh the injuries that it
causes to the rights of others. It follows that, in general, such material
should not be protected by the First Amendment.
2.

Material that Has Serious Value

But what of sexual material that portrays violence against
women, but which, to use the language of the Supreme Court’s
obscenity test, reasonably may be thought to have “serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value”?266 Should such material be
entitled to protection under a rights-based approach to the First
Amendment?
In many cases, works with serious value do not violate the rights
of women at all. Consider a film or novel that graphically portrays
rape for the purpose of showing how brutal and dehumanizing it is.
Although this work depicts violence against women, it does not do so
in a way that is intended to show such violence as legitimate or
desirable.267 For this reason, the work does not violate the right to
recognition or the related rights to personality, personal security, and
equality.
The same is true of many other works with serious value. In
general, such works portray people not as generic types, but as
individual characters with distinctive traits and personalities.268
Because we tend to care about such characters, serious works generally do not portray violence against them as legitimate or desirable
(except in cases where violence is legally or morally justified).269
Moreover, even in cases where unjustified violence is portrayed as

265. The concept of relational rights also provides a response to another argument for
protecting violent pornography. As we have seen, one reason for holding that pornography
generally falls within the fundamental right to free expression is that it influences the society
and its culture. See supra text accompanying notes 221–22. But the right to participate in and
contribute to the common culture is a relational right, which must be exercised with due regard
for the rights of other citizens. See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 86, at 1347–48.
Because violent pornography infringes those rights, it has no general claim to protection as an
exercise of social liberty.
266. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
267. See, e.g., MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 12, at 176 (making a
similar argument under the model ordinance).
268. See CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY, supra note 168, at 236–38.
269. See id. at 231–32.
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being legitimate or desirable, if this violence is directed against
individualized characters, the work is generally best understood as a
story about those particular characters, rather than women in general.
Because the work does not explicitly or implicitly refer to women in
general, it does not violate their rights. Nor does the work violate the
rights of any individual woman (unless the character portrayed is an
actual person, as in the University of Michigan case discussed
above270).
In these cases, the work does not injure the rights of others at all,
and so there is no need to reach the question of whether such an
injury is outweighed by the value of the speech. Suppose, however,
that there are some works that do portray women in a generic way,
and that represent violence against them as legitimate and desirable,
but that nevertheless have serious literary, artistic, or other value.
Should works of this sort (say, those of the Marquis de Sade) be
protected by the First Amendment? On one side, it may be argued
that the right to recognition is the foundation of all other rights,
including that of free speech. Because recognition is the most fundamental right, it should prevail in case of conflict with other rights. To
put it in a slightly different way, all the rights that an individual has,
including freedom of speech, ultimately depend on his right to
recognition. But such recognition carries with it an obligation to
recognize others as persons. Individuals can have no rights that are
inconsistent with this basic obligation. It follows that the right to free
speech does not extend to speech that denies recognition to others.271
However convincing these arguments may be as applied to violent pornography in general, I believe that the opposing view is more
persuasive as applied to works that have serious literary or artistic
value, in the sense that they seek to affect our basic understanding of
human life and the world. Such works have relatively limited impact
on the rights of others (at least in a direct or immediate way), while
they make some contribution to intellectual life. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that they should be protected
despite the injury that they may cause to the rights of others.
I should make clear that, in saying this, I do not mean to imply
that such works should be protected because they may turn out to be
270. See supra text accompanying notes 232–33.
271. MacKinnon reaches a similar conclusion based on the overriding importance of
equality. See MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 12, at 152–53 (“[I]f a woman is
subjected, why should it matter that the work has other value?”).
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true. As I have argued elsewhere, recognition is not only the most
fundamental right, it is also a basic condition for the search for
truth.272 This search requires a willingness to move beyond the
bounds of one’s own subjective viewpoint and to engage in dialogue
with others in an effort to develop a more objective, or at least
shared, understanding of ourselves and the world. To engage in this
dialogue, it is necessary to recognize others as human beings capable
of taking part in this activity. Indeed, mutual recognition is not
merely an essential condition for the search for truth; it will also be an
integral part of any truth that is arrived at through this process.
There are strong reasons, then, to believe that recognitiondenying speech is contrary to the fundamental truth about human
beings. Thus, speech of this sort should not be protected on the
ground that it might turn out to be true. Nevertheless, as Mill argues,
even false speech can make a contribution to the search for truth, if
only by leading to a clearer perception of the truth, and by giving us
greater assurance that all viewpoints have been considered.273 Moreover, serious works of art or literature generally express some truths,
at the same time that they falsely deny recognition to other persons.
In this way, they contribute to a more comprehensive understanding
of truth. In addition, engaging with such works in a critical way
promotes the development of our intellectual and moral faculties.
Finally, in addressing the reader or viewer as an intelligent person, a
serious work of art or literature may be said to recognize that individual’s humanity in a practical way—even when she turns out to be one
of the very people whose humanity the work is intended to deny. In
this deeply ironic way, serious works of art or literature are compelled
to recognize the humanity of other people, even when they are
intended to do the opposite.
In short, while violent pornography generally should be unprotected, protection should be accorded to works that have serious
value, either on the ground that they do not injure the rights of
others, or on the ground that the injury they cause is outweighed by
their value. Of course, this does not imply that feminists are not
justified in criticizing such works and combating their influence.
Indeed, the Millian arguments for freedom of speech and thought
depend on the notion that false beliefs will be subjected to vigorous
criticism. Although serious works have a right to protection under
272. See Heyman, Hate Speech, supra note 226, at lxii–lxiii.
273. See MILL, supra note 137, at 34–44.
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the First Amendment, those works that deny recognition to others
are properly regarded as contrary to morality and injurious to the
social and cultural life of the community. These effects should be
combated through moral, social, and cultural means, even though the
works cannot be regulated by law. To put it another way, the struggle
for recognition is one that takes place on many different levels—legal,
political, moral, social, and cultural. Law plays an essential part in
this effort, but other forms of action are no less important.
C.

Conclusion

Although the radical feminist critique of pornography is too
sweeping, it is fundamentally true as applied to violent pornography.
In this Part, I have shown that this critique can be expressed within
the framework of a rights-based approach to the First Amendment—
an approach that seeks to present a principled and coherent account
of the foundations and limits of freedom of speech. Violent pornography infringes the rights of women to personality, personal security,
and equality, as well as the foundational right to recognition. Moreover, violent pornography generally does not have any important
value that justifies the injuries that it causes. For this reason, such
pornography should not receive protection under the First Amendment. However, an exception should be made for works of serious
value. In general, such works do not violate the rights of others, and
in cases where they do, it is reasonable to hold that they should be
privileged despite the injuries that they cause.
In Butler v. Regina,274 the Supreme Court of Canada followed a
similar line of reasoning in upholding a federal anti-pornography law.
Although the law was originally based on the traditional conservative
view that obscene materials contravene public morality, the court
held that this rationale was no longer sufficient to justify the law after
the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in
1982.275 Because the statute restricted expression on the basis of its
content, the Court found that the law infringed the right of free
expression protected by section 2(b) of the Charter.276 The dispositive
question then became whether this restriction was allowable under
section 1, which provides that all Charter rights are subject to “such
274. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can).
275. Id. at 492–93.
276. Id. at 488–89.
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reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society.”277 On this point, the Court ruled
that while a ban on all pornography could not be justified, the law
could properly ban violent and degrading pornography.278 On one
hand, such pornography generally had little value.279 On the other
hand, Parliament reasonably could believe that such material caused
substantial harm to women by undermining their rights to dignity,
equality, and freedom from violence—values that were “of fundamental importance in a free and democratic society.”280 In this way
violent and degrading pornography also violated the fundamental
norms of the community.281 For these reasons, the Court concluded
that such pornography fell outside the Charter’s protection. However, the Court recognized an exception for works of serious value.282
In the United States, the courts have taken a very different approach to the problem of pornography. In Miller v. California283 and
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,284 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
traditional morality-based approach. At least thus far, however, the
courts have rejected an approach based on harm to women. The
leading case is American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut,285 in
which Judge Easterbrook, writing for a panel of the Seventh Circuit,
ruled that an Indianapolis ordinance based on the MacKinnonDworkin model violated the First Amendment. Remarkably, Easterbrook did not deny that pornography causes serious harm to women.
Instead, he wrote:
[W]e accept the premises of this legislation. Depictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordination. The subordinate status of
women in turn leads to affront and lower pay at work, insult and
injury at home, battery and rape on the streets. In the language of
the legislature, “pornography is central in creating and maintaining
sex as a basis of discrimination. Pornography is a systematic prac277. CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS § 1 (1982).
278. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 484–85.
279. Id. at 499–501, 509.
280. Id. at 478–81, 493–99, 509.
281. Id. at 493.
282. Id. at 505–06; see also id. at 481–83 (discussing the nature of this defense). For a variety
of perspectives on Butler, see Daniel O. Conkle, Harm, Morality, and Feminist Religion:
Canada’s New—But Not So New—Approach to Obscenity, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 105 (1993);
Kathleen E. Mahoney, Recognizing the Constitutional Significance of Harmful Speech: The
Canadian View of Pornography and Hate Propaganda, in THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 171,
at 277; Thelma McCormack, Censorship in Canada, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 165 (1993).
283. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
284. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
285. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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tice of exploitation and subordination based on sex which differentially harms women. The bigotry and contempt it produces, with
the acts of aggression it fosters, harm women’s opportunities for
equality and rights [of all kinds].”286

“Yet this,” Easterbrook continued, “simply demonstrates the
power of pornography as speech.”287 Under the First Amendment,
this is a matter for the people to determine: “[A]n idea is as powerful
as the audience allows it to be.”288 To be sure, ideas can be “pernicious”: “The beliefs of the Nazis led to the death of millions, those of
the Klan to the repression of millions.”289 Under the First Amendment, however, speech may not be restricted on this ground. Any
other approach “leaves the government in control of all the institutions of culture, the great censor and director of which thoughts are
good for us.”290
In general terms, then, Easterbrook’s objection to the Indianapolis ordinance was that it restricted speech because of the ideas it
contained, or because of fear that those ideas would lead to “unhappy
consequences” such as violence and discrimination.291 But Easterbrook’s objection also took a more specific form. By defining pornography in terms of the subordination of women, the ordinance had
“establishe[d] an ‘approved’ view of women, of how they may react to
sexual encounters, of how the sexes may relate to each other. Those
who espouse the approved view may use sexual images; those who do
not, may not.”292 In this way, the ordinance discriminated between
different perspectives in violation of the fundamental First Amendment rule against viewpoint discrimination.293
The rights-based theory provides a response to both of these objections. It is certainly true, as Easterbrook argues, that under the
First Amendment government may not restrict speech merely be-

286. 771 F.2d at 329 (footnote omitted) (quoting Indianapolis Code § 16-1(a)(2)). In a
footnote, Easterbrook qualified this statement, observing that the evidence on the effects of
pornography was conflicting and “very difficult to interpret.” Id. at 329 n.2. “In saying that we
accept the finding that pornography . . . leads to unhappy consequences,” he explained, “we
mean only that there is evidence to this effect, that this evidence is consistent with much human
experience, and that as judges we must accept the legislative resolution of such disputed
empirical questions.” Id. (citation omitted).
287. Id. at 329.
288. Id. at 327–28.
289. Id. at 328.
290. Id. at 330.
291. Id. at 328, 329 & n.2.
292. Id. at 328.
293. Id. at 324, 328, 332.
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cause it disapproves of the ideas expressed, or because it fears that
the speech may be persuasive or effective. But the Amendment
should not be interpreted to protect speech that unjustifiably invades
the rights of others. The central question in cases like Hudnut should
be whether particular forms of pornography infringe those rights
without adequate justification. If so, then the speech may be regulated without violating either the general principles of the First
Amendment or the rule against viewpoint discrimination in particular.
Thus, Hudnut’s rationale for rejecting the harm-based approach
to pornography is unpersuasive.294 Before we conclude that Hudnut’s
position is mistaken, however, we should consider whether it can be
defended in a different way. My argument in this Part has been
directed toward showing that the regulation of violent pornography
can be justified in principle. As we have seen, however, constitutional
interpretation also has an important cultural dimension. In determining the scope of free speech, what is important is not only how rights
should be understood in theory, but also how they are understood
within a particular social and cultural order.295
The thrust of my argument has been that violent pornography inflicts collective injury to women by violating their rights to dignity
and recognition as human beings. In response, some might object
that the American understanding of rights focuses on the traditional
rights of life, liberty, and property, and that the notion of dignitary
rights provides too tenuous a basis for restrictions on free speech.
Moreover, it might be said that regarding women as a group would
run contrary to the strong American commitment to individualism,
and that the best way to secure the dignity and equality of women is
to view them as individuals, not as a group. On these grounds, it
could be argued that Hudnut was right to conclude that a harm-based
approach to pornography was inconsistent with the American understanding of freedom of speech.
This argument has considerable force. Among other things, it
does much to explain why American and Canadian courts have taken
such divergent positions on the pornography issue. Nevertheless, the

294. For fuller criticism of this rationale, see Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy, supra note 184,
at 698–703; Sunstein, supra note 177. For a defense of Easterbrook’s view, see Geoffrey R.
Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
461 (1986).
295. See supra Part I.D.7.
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argument is flawed, for it rests upon an overly unitary and static view
of American society and culture.296 Although it is true that many
Americans hold the positions that the argument attributes to them,
many others would disagree—that is, they would be more willing to
protect people against dignitary and emotional injury, and to believe
that society should be concerned with harms to groups. On issues
such as these, no clear consensus exists within American society.
Instead, individuals and groups hold divergent views, reflecting
differing beliefs, values, and experiences. Moreover, the views that
people take on such issues are capable of changing over time.
For these reasons, it cannot be said that the harm-based approach to pornography conflicts with a single, broadly accepted
“American understanding” of freedom of speech. Instead, as we have
seen, the validity of that approach depends on whether a particular
form of pornography violates the rights to recognition and dignity.
The answer to this question depends in turn on whether our society
does or should recognize those rights. Insofar as this is an issue of
principle, judges can legitimately rule on it. On the other hand, to the
extent that it is a question of the society’s particular understanding,
the issue should be determined through political, social, and cultural
debate. As I have argued, restrictions on some forms of pornography
are justifiable in principle. In cases like this, courts should not
interpret the Constitution in such a way as to cut off an ongoing social
debate, or to prevent new rights from emerging and being recognized
by the community.
If the argument of this Part is correct, then as a matter of substantive right, violent pornography should be regarded as outside the
protection of the First Amendment. Under the rights-based theory,
however, this is not the only important issue. Instead, even when a
regulation is justifiable on substantive grounds, it may be improper
for other reasons. In particular, laws that regulate speech must be
carefully reviewed for vagueness and overbreadth, to ensure that they
demarcate the boundary between lawful and unlawful speech in a
reasonably clear manner, and that they sweep no more broadly than
necessary to protect the rights of others.297 In my view, the Indian-

296. For a critique of conceptions of culture as “stable, coherent and singular,” see Robert
C. Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 487 (2003).
297. See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 86, at 1316–17 (explaining that even
where regulation is substantively justified, it nevertheless may be improper for practical and
institutional reasons of this sort).
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apolis ordinance was objectionable on these grounds.298 Would the
same be true of laws that were limited to violent pornography? Like
so many aspects of the pornography debate, this issue is certain to be
controversial.299 One point seems clear, however: the approach that I
am advocating is less problematic in this regard than the current
doctrine. Under the Miller test, a work may be banned on grounds of
obscenity if
(a) . . . the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest, (b) . . . the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and (c) . . . the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.300

The restrictions that I have defended would regulate only material
that falls within the Miller definition, and would further be limited to
material that portrays sexual violence against a group of people.301
Moreover, any ban on violent pornography should draw an exception
for works with serious value.302 A law of this sort would not only be
298. In addition to raising substantial vagueness problems, see Am. Booksellers Ass’n v.
Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1337–39 (S.D. Ind. 1984), aff’d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), the
ordinance made no exception for works with serious value, and thus might well have extended
to material that should be constitutionally protected under both traditional doctrine and a
rights-based approach.
299. Indeed, many civil libertarians would doubt whether it is possible to regulate pornography in a way that does not violate the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. See, e.g., Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding that
“none of the available formulas . . . can reduce the vagueness to a tolerable level while at the
same time striking an acceptable balance” between First Amendment freedoms and “the
asserted state interest” in regulating obscene materials); Strossen, supra note 246, at 1103–04
(suggesting that definitions of obscenity and pornography are inherently “vague and subjective”).
300. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
301. A law of this sort should not be held unconstitutional under R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377 (1992). In R.A.V., the Court took the position that, although the government could
properly ban an entire category of unprotected speech, such as fighting words or obscenity, the
government generally could not choose to ban only a subset of such material. According to
Justice Scalia, such selective regulation generally runs afoul of the First Amendment rule
against content discrimination. See id. at 382–90. However, Scalia acknowledged that selective
regulation was permissible “[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of
the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable.” Id. at 388. For example, “[a]
State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is the most patently offensive in its
prurience.” Id. Similarly, it would appear that a state could reasonably choose to prohibit only
that obscenity that depicts sexual violence, on the ground that, in contemporary society, such
portrayals are the most patently offensive to community standards. For a critique of R.A.V.’s
extension of the content neutrality doctrine to unprotected speech, see Heyman, Spheres of
Autonomy, supra note 184, at 710–14. This Term, the Supreme Court retreated from the rigid
formalism of R.A.V. in Virginia v. Black, 71 U.S.L.W. 4263 (2003) (upholding a ban on cross
burning with the intent to intimidate others).
302. See supra Part III.B.2.
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consistent with the Miller standard, it would be narrower than the
anti-obscenity laws that are permitted by that standard. Thus, even
from a civil libertarian perspective, this approach would appear to
represent an advance over current doctrine.
As this discussion shows, laws that are designed to prevent harms
to women from pornography need not conflict with the traditional
doctrine set forth in Miller. To put it another way, the approach that
I am advocating would seek some common ground between the
traditional and feminist views, by contending that the portrayals that
are most contrary to contemporary community standards are those
that glorify sexual violence. In addition to the theoretical reasons
that I have given for seeking common ground, an approach of this
sort is likely to be far more effective in moving the law in a feminist
direction than a position that emphasizes the differences between the
feminist view and traditional law.303
IV. PORNOGRAPHY AND THE RIGHTS OF THE COMMUNITY
In the previous Part, I explored whether pornography could be
regulated because it causes injury to women. In this Part, I turn to
conservative concerns about obscenity and pornography.
Traditionally, obscenity regulation is said to be justified to protect “‘the social interest in order and morality.’”304 Insofar as this
means preventing moral harms to willing viewers, the justification is
at odds with a rights-based approach. Under that view, speech may
not be restricted simply because the community regards it as immoral
or desires to prevent moral harms to those who choose to view it.
In this Part, I explore whether, and to what extent, the conservative case for obscenity regulation can be accommodated within a
rights-based approach. When recast in rights-based terms, the
conservative view focuses on the rights of communities. It asserts that
303. See, e.g., MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 12, at 147 (insisting that
the traditional concept of obscenity and the feminist concept of pornography “represent two
entirely different things”). By contrast, it was by reinterpreting a traditional anti-obscenity law
to focus on harm to women that the Canadian Supreme Court was able to reach the result it did
in Butler. See supra text accompanying notes 274–82.
I should note that, while my argument in this Part has focused on the impact of violent
pornography on the rights of women, the argument is not necessarily limited to those rights.
Thus, if there are genres of violent pornography that deny recognition to men or other groups
(or that otherwise violate their rights), such material should be regarded as wrongful for the
same reasons.
304. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) (emphasis added in Roth).
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communities should have some power to regulate pornography in
order to protect the community’s rights and to promote its good.
Although this approach is primarily identified with moral conservatives, it also may be regarded as a communitarian position.305
This view is likely to be highly controversial, not only in its application to the pornography debate, but also because of its reliance on
the notion of community rights. As I have suggested, however, such
rights are deeply rooted in the liberal tradition.306 Indeed, in both
classical and modern liberal thought, free speech itself has a collective
dimension.307 If the rights of the community provide part of the
justification for free speech, however, they may also justify certain
limitations on that right. In the following sections, I consider whether
this is true with respect to pornography. First, I shall argue that
violent pornography constitutes a wrong not only to women, but also
to the community as a whole. Such material may be banned without
violating the First Amendment. Second, I shall argue that pornography may be excluded from public places in order to protect the rights
of unwilling viewers as well as those of the community itself. Third, I
shall contend that the community has a right to shield minors from
exposure to pornography. Under the second and third points, the
state may not ban sexually oriented material, but may regulate the
ways in which it is displayed and distributed. Finally, I shall argue
that the state may properly take decency into account when it provides subsidies for expression, such as public funding for the arts. In
these four ways, the conservative position can be accommodated
within the framework of the rights-based approach, without undermining the fundamental right to free expression.
A. Violent Pornography
In Part III, I argued that, by portraying women as mere sex objects that can be used or destroyed at will, violent pornography denies
them recognition as human beings. In this way, violent pornography
infringes the rights of women. But recognition is not only a right of
individuals, it is also a bond of community. As Locke and other
classic social contract theorists realized, individuals cannot live in
peace, or security, or community with others unless they recognize
305. See supra text accompanying note 176.
306. See supra Part II.B.2.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 205–07.
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one another as human beings.308 In Lockean terms, a denial of recognition “undermine[s] the Foundations of Society.”309 For this reason,
it constitutes a wrong to the community itself, as well as to the
particular people who are affected.
Part III further showed that violent pornography undermines
other rights of women. But wrongs to individuals often constitute
wrongs to the community as well. From a rights-based perspective,
the deepest explanation for this is that fundamental rights belong not
only to particular individuals, but to all persons or members of the
society. Accordingly, an act that violates such a right strikes at all
who share that right—the entire community—and not merely the
particular individual who is injured.310 It is for this reason that many
violations of individual rights constitute not merely torts (wrongs
against private persons), but also crimes (wrongs against the community).
As I argued in Part III, it is reasonable to believe that violent
pornography diminishes women’s sense of personal security; represents them in a way that contravenes basic standards of human
dignity; and undermines their right to equality. In these ways, pornography infringes rights that belong not merely to women but to all
members of the society. For this reason as well, violent pornography
may be regarded as a wrong against the community as a whole.
Moreover, in most cases, violent pornography lacks any value that
would outweigh the injuries that it causes. In such cases, the rightsbased approach would allow a ban on violent pornography to protect
the rights of the community itself, as well as those who are portrayed
by it.
B.

Public Places

Another concern that is shared by conservatives and communitarians relates to the impact that pornography may have on the public
environment. I believe that this concern too can be met, at least in
part, under a rights-based approach. In particular, communities
should have the right to outlaw pornographic displays in public
places.

308. See Heyman, Hate Speech, supra note 226, at xli–xlii, xlviii–l.
309. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 49 (James Tully ed.,
1983) (1st ed., William Popple trans., 1689).
310. This argument is based on HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 239, §§ 95, 218.
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To develop this argument, it is useful to begin with a simple
model of speech and other activity protected by the First Amendment.311 The Amendment protects inward thought and feeling as well
as outward expression and communication. In turn, communication
includes the following elements: (1) an act of expression by the
speaker; (2) the speech itself; and (3) its reception by the listener. In
this way, communication involves individual acts by the speaker and
the listener. But in many cases it involves more than this. As Charles
Taylor has explained, communication transforms what is initially a
matter of individual awareness into a matter of common awareness.312
In other words, the function of communication is not merely to
convey thoughts from one individual to another, but also to develop a
shared understanding. At the same time, communication forms (or
takes place within) a relationship between the participants. In this
way, communication has not only an individual but also a social
dimension. Of course, this social dimension is present in ordinary
social life. It is also exemplified by the political discourse that Meiklejohn describes, as well as by art, literature, religion, science, and
other forms of social and cultural discourse.
As I have shown elsewhere, this account of communication can
serve to illuminate our understanding of the rights protected by the
First Amendment.313 As the Supreme Court emphasized in Stanley v.
Georgia,314 under the First Amendment the government may not
invade the autonomy of the individual by seeking to regulate the
content of her inward thoughts and feelings. In addition, speakers
have a right to determine the content of their own expression, while
listeners have the right to decide what expression they wish to be
exposed to.315 When the government interferes with those rights, it
invades a sphere of autonomy surrounding the individual speaker or
listener. Similarly, when the government seeks to control public
discourse, it invades the autonomy of the community as a whole, as
well as the rights of the individuals involved.

311. The following discussion is more fully developed in Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy,
supra note 184, at 653–66.
312. See CHARLES TAYLOR, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in
PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 189–90 (1995); CHARLES TAYLOR, Irreducibly Social Goods, in
id. 138–39; CHARLES TAYLOR, Theories of Meaning, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 259–60, 263–
66 (1985).
313. See Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy, supra note 184, at 653–66.
314. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
315. See supra text accompanying notes 217–18.
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On the account that I have just sketched, the activity protected
by the First Amendment begins with the individual’s subjective
thoughts and feelings. The individual may choose to keep these to
herself or to communicate them to others. In the latter case, she must
translate her thoughts and emotions into a form that can be understood by, and that is of interest to, others as well as herself; that is, she
must transform them into a matter of common interest. This account
further implies that communication can be of common interest to
smaller or larger circles of people—from two or more individuals, to
the society at large, to human beings in general. Thus, whether
speech is “private” or “public” is a matter of degree. In rough terms,
however, we may distinguish between expression that is public, in the
sense that it is of common interest to a substantial portion of the
community, and expression that is private, in the sense that it is of
legitimate interest solely, or at least primarily, to the individual
herself or those with whom she chooses to share it.
I should emphasize that, in saying this, I do not mean to imply
that a bright line can be drawn between the public and private realms.
The difficulty is not merely a practical one, but inheres in the very
notions of public and private. The community is composed of individuals, and their goods make up the common good. An essential
function of public discourse is to bring the concerns of individuals and
groups to the attention of the community, and thereby to transform
matters that were once regarded as private (such as domestic violence
or workplace safety) into matters of public concern.316 Indeed, even
the most personal matters can be made of common interest, especially
through art and literature.317 For this to take place, however, the
individual must transform her thoughts, feelings, and experiences into
a form that is not merely personal, but that is understandable by and
of interest to others. Moreover, as I have observed, different kinds of
expression are of interest to different numbers of people.
In general, pornography may be regarded as falling on the private side of the spectrum. There are few things more deeply personal
than an individual’s sexual thoughts and desires. Insofar as sexually
explicit material is calculated to stimulate or satisfy such desires, it
relates to a matter that is intensely personal and private. Material of
this sort is of interest to the individuals who choose to view it, but it is

316. See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 86, at 1352–53.
317. See CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY, supra note 168, at 230.
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not a matter of common or public interest in the way that political,
literary, artistic, scientific, and other forms of discourse are.
Several important conclusions follow. First, as the Supreme
Court held in Stanley, the state may not ban the mere private possession of pornography. The First Amendment, as well as the right to
privacy, protects the individual’s right “to read or observe what he
pleases” and “to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the
privacy of his own home.”318
Second, just as individuals should be free to view sexual material,
they also should be free not to. In particular, there is no right to
expose other individuals to such material without their consent.
Precisely because such material is so deeply personal, individuals
should have the right to decide for themselves whether to view it. To
put the point another way, viewing such material may be regarded not
only as a sort of speech, but also as a sort of sexual experience. But
no one has a right to force a sexual experience on another against her
will. In the present context, such conduct infringes the other’s rights
of personality. In particular, exposing others to sexual material
against their will may be regarded as an invasion of privacy, or the
right to be free from highly offensive intrusions into one’s personal
life. Such conduct may also violate the right to be free from unjustified infliction of emotional distress.319 In a workplace setting, such
conduct may constitute a form of sexual harassment.320 Finally, far
from being protected by the First Amendment, such conduct contravenes the basic principle of Stanley—that respect for autonomy
dictates that individuals should be free to decide for themselves what
they wish to read or view. In this instance, then, the law is clearly
justified in protecting what the Supreme Court has called “[t]he
unwilling listener’s interest in avoiding unwanted communication.”321
Third, and somewhat more controversially, the right of individuals to be free from unwanted exposure to sexual material should
apply not only in the private but also in the public sphere. It is true,

318. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564–65 (1969). Of course, this right should not apply
if the possession or use of the material itself causes or perpetuates wrongful injury to another, as
the Supreme Court has recognized in the context of child pornography. See Osborne v. Ohio,
495 U.S. 103, 108–11 (1990).
319. See supra note 170 (citing views of Thomas Emerson and Justice Brennan to this
effect).
320. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
321. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000).
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as the Court remarked in Cohen v. California,322 “that ‘we are often
“captives” outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech.’”323 But the Court made this statement in the context
of speech that was public in nature. When expression is directed
toward the community on political, social, cultural, or other matters
of common interest, it may not be restricted merely because some
individuals are unwilling to be exposed to it or consider it offensive.
Speech that is properly public, and that does not violate the rights of
others, may not be restricted for merely private reasons. But pornography presents a very different case. As a general matter, such
material is private rather than public in nature. Its predominant
purpose is not to contribute to political, social, and cultural debate,
but to stimulate or fulfill the sexual desires of individuals. Contrary
to the view that is sometimes taken, this does not mean that such
material should receive no protection under the First Amendment.
But this point does have critical implications for whether there is a
right to display such material in public places. On one hand, the
public display of such material infringes the rights of other individuals
by exposing them to sexual material without their consent. To be
sure, it is sometimes possible to avoid such material by averting one’s
eyes.324 Yet individuals who are in public places should have a right to
enjoy the public environment and to participate in the life of the
community without averting their eyes from intensely personal
matters that they do not wish to see. Thus the public display of
pornographic material infringes the rights of others. On the other
hand, because it is private, such material is not entitled to the same
immunity as public speech in public places. While public speech may
not properly be restricted to protect the sensibilities of private
persons, there is no persuasive reason to hold that the First Amendment imposes the same limitation on the regulation of private speech.
For these reasons, the law should be allowed to restrict the display of
pornographic material in public places.
It is important to note that, up to this point, the argument that I
have developed has been based on individual rights—in particular,
the right to be free from unwanted exposure to sexual material. It is

322. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
323. Id. at 21 (quoting Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)).
324. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1975).
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for these reasons that many liberals would support a ban on public
display.325
Can such a policy also be justified by reference to the rights of
the community, as some conservatives and communitarians would
urge? One argument to this effect would proceed as follows. What is
seen or done in public places affects the public environment. That
environment is a matter of common awareness, and therefore a
matter of concern to the entire community. For this reason, the
community generally should have a right to regulate things that affect
the public environment, for example, by adopting various forms of
aesthetic regulation. But public displays of sexual material may
reasonably be thought to have an adverse impact on the public
environment. Therefore, the community has a right to restrict such
displays. Of course, the community’s power to regulate the public
environment may not be exercised in a way that violates the First
Amendment or other constitutional rights. Under the public forum
doctrine, citizens have a right to engage in public speech in public
places,326 and the First Amendment generally bars the government
from restricting such speech on the basis of its content, or because it
finds the speech offensive.327 Once again, however, these doctrines
apply to speech that is public in nature, not to private speech such as
sexually explicit material. Therefore, the First Amendment should
not bar the community from regulating the public display of such
material in the interest of the public environment.
A more controversial argument would contend that the public
display of sexual material may be regulated because it contravenes
the substantive values or norms of the community. In its most
general form, such an argument might proceed as follows. In addition
to being individuals, human beings also belong to various communities, ranging from personal relationships and families, to workplaces,
to other organizations within “civil society,” to the community as a
whole. Each community is instituted for a particular good, and is
characterized by certain norms of conduct.328 These norms define the
conduct that the community considers to be appropriate in the
relations of individuals toward one another. At the same time, these

325. See supra note 170.
326. See TRIBE, supra note 170, § 12–24.
327. See, e.g., Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
328. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 196, bk. I, ch. 1; LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note
195, bk. II, §§ 2, 77–89.
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norms constitute the way of life of the community. In the case of the
society as a whole, these norms may be referred to as civility.
In a liberal society (the argument might continue) the community’s power to enforce such standards is limited. But the community
should have the power to uphold standards of civility within the
public sphere.329 The display of pornographic material may be
regulated because it violates these communal standards. At this
point, different rationales would be offered. For moral conservatives,
the problem would be that the display of such material is inconsistent
with the norms of appropriate sexual conduct that a good society
seeks to promote. Many feminists would hold that the display of such
material is improper because it depicts women in an inappropriate
and degrading manner. Some communitarians and neorepublicans
also would be concerned that the display of such material would
undermine the focus on public discourse and the common good that
should characterize the public sphere.
My own inclination is to believe that regulation of public display
of sexually explicit material is justified not only by individual rights,
but also by some of the more communitarian considerations that I
have mentioned. The issues involved are both deep and complex,
however, and I shall not attempt to fully resolve them here. Instead,
the point that I want to stress is this: although liberals, communitarians, neorepublicans, feminists, conservatives, and others may
deeply disagree about the underlying rationale, there is a relatively
broad consensus on the ultimate issue—that is, that a ban on the
public display of pornography is justified in order to protect other
rights, whether those rights are understood to belong to individuals,
groups, or the community as a whole. In this way, the issue provides
a striking example of how a rights-based approach may allow us to
develop some common ground among sharply differing ideological
positions.330

329. See, e.g., Hadley Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the
Defamation of Groups, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 281.
330. Of course, any regulation of pornography in public places would have to satisfy
concerns about vagueness and overbreadth. See supra text accompanying notes 297–302. But
this is a challenge that has to be faced not only by a rights-based approach, but also by any
view—conservative, liberal, or progressive—that would allow the community to regulate
pornography in public places. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84, 113
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (rejecting traditional obscenity law, partly because of vagueness
and overbreadth concerns, but nevertheless suggesting that state may regulate the manner of
distribution of sexually oriented material to protect children and unconsenting adults).
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Shielding Children from Pornography

The community also should have authority to protect children
from exposure to pornography—not only by restricting the public
display of such material,331 but also by regulating the manner in which
it is distributed.
As a general matter, individuals should have the right to see or
hear what they choose. But this right does not apply with the same
force to children. For the liberal tradition, rights are grounded in
autonomy, or the capacity for rational self-direction.332 Because
children do not fully possess this capacity, they lack full autonomy.
Instead, others must care for them, not only to safeguard their
physical well-being, but also to promote their intellectual, emotional,
and moral development, and to enable them to develop into autonomous individuals.333 In a liberal society, this responsibility rests
primarily with parents, who have both a duty and a right “to direct
the upbringing and education of [their] children.”334 It follows that
parents should have some authority to determine what forms of
expression their children are exposed to.
In our society, many parents believe that certain kinds of material—such as those containing graphic sex or violence—are harmful to
children. As I shall suggest below, this belief is a reasonable one, and
parents therefore should have a right to shield their children from
such material.
It might seem that such authority should rest solely with parents,
and that the state should have no role. But the widespread availability of such material in the larger society makes it virtually impossible
for parents to act effectively on their own. Instead, if parents are to
have meaningful rights in this area, the community must have the
power to regulate the manner in which such material is distributed.335
331. See supra Part IV.B.
332. See, e.g., LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 195, bk. II, § 63.
333. See, e.g., id. §§ 55–67; MILL, supra note 137, at 11, 97.
334. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
335. To put the point in traditional social contract terms, although the responsibility for
educating children naturally belongs to parents, see LOCKE, GOVERNMENT, supra note 195, bk.
II, § 56, it would be reasonable for them to delegate some of this power to the community in
order to enable them to exercise their rights more effectively.
Moreover, it is important to remember that, for the liberal tradition, the rights of parents
are rooted in their duty to promote the well-being of their children. See id. § 67. In situations
where parents neglect or violate this duty, the state may and should act to protect the children’s
well-being. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 137, at 97–98 (arguing that the state should require
parents to educate their children). It follows that, although parents should have substantial
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Moreover, because human nature has a social dimension, the society
and its culture inevitably have a powerful impact on the character of
its members. Although liberalism presumes that adults are sufficiently autonomous to resist harmful social and cultural influences,
this assumption cannot be made with respect to children. For these
reasons, the society should have a duty to restrain itself and its
members (such as those who make and sell pornography) from
exposing minors to material that the community reasonably believes
to be harmful. This duty applies with special force in areas where the
society has undertaken a positive responsibility with regard to children, such as public education. But the duty also applies more
generally.
In short, the community’s authority to shield children from harmful material rests on two interrelated justifications: (1) it is legitimate
for the state to assist parents in the exercise of their own right to
protect their children against material they reasonably consider to be
harmful; and (2) the society has an independent duty to restrain itself
and its members from exposing children to material it reasonably
regards as harmful. In both cases, the community must make a
judgment about what material is harmful to children. It is also
necessary to consider how much value a particular form of material
has, for regulation is justified only where it is reasonable to believe
that the harm that flows from the material outweighs its value.
Restrictions that cannot be justified in this way are not only improper,
they may also violate the First Amendment rights of older minors to
decide for themselves what forms of expression they wish to see or
hear.336 Although children lack full autonomy, their capacity for selfdetermination increases over time. As they near adulthood, they
develop an increasing ability to exercise rights to self-expression and
to receive information and ideas. Although parents and the state
retain the authority to impose reasonable restrictions, regulations that
are unreasonable may violate the First Amendment.
authority to determine what expression their children are exposed to, this authority is not
unlimited. It seems clear, for example, that the state reasonably could determine that preteens
should not be admitted to theaters showing sadomasochistic pornography, regardless of parental
consent. In short, while authority in this area should rest largely with parents, see Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997) (emphasizing parental responsibility), it would be a mistake to
conclude that the state has no legitimate role. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640
(1968) (recognizing that the state “has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth”).
336. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 895 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (recognizing that unjustified restrictions would violate the rights of minors
under the First Amendment).
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Of course, the question of what material is harmful to children is
a controversial one. This is particularly true in the area of sexuality.
Some people are skeptical that minors are harmed by exposure to
sexually explicit material, or that such material can reasonably be
distinguished from other expression (such as information on
contraception, reproductive health services, and sexually transmitted
diseases) that minors should have access to.337 However, it is fair to
say that most people in American society, including most parents,
believe that children should not be exposed to pornography. To be
sure, they would give differing explanations for this position. Conservatives maintain that pornography conflicts with appropriate moral
attitudes toward sexuality, while many feminists disapprove of such
material on the ground that it degrades women. Finally, while
liberals are less inclined to regard pornography as harmful in general,
many would regard it as inappropriate for children—for example, on
the ground that it portrays sexuality in a depersonalized way which
undermines the connection between sex and love. Although these
views differ in their rationale, they agree in holding that it is inappropriate for children to be exposed to pornography. This strengthens
the case for regulation, by showing that multiple perspectives lead to
the same result.338 Moreover, these views are not mutually exclusive:
many people believe that pornography is harmful to children for
several (or even all) of these reasons. Once again, this provides a
good example of how it is possible to reach some common ground in
the culture wars.
The view that I have outlined is generally consistent with the Supreme Court’s decisions on the subject. In Ginsberg v. New York,339
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, declared that a state “legislature could properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for
example, who have . . . primary responsibility for children’s well-being
are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility.”340 In addition, he asserted that “[t]he State . . . has an

337. See, e.g., MARJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN (2001); Catherine J.
Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children from Controversial
Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 501–06 (2000).
338. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1642–43 (1987) (arguing that positions that are supported by a
“web” of diverse values “provide[] a basis for broader social consensus” than those that are
supported by a single value).
339. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
340. Id. at 639.
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independent interest in the well-being of its youth.”341 Deferring to
the legislature’s determination that exposure to pornography tended
to “‘impair[] the ethical and moral development’” of young people,342
the Court sustained the constitutionality of a statute that barred the
sale to persons under the age of seventeen of material that met the
Supreme Court’s obscenity test, as adapted to apply to minors.343 In
subsequent cases, the Court has repeatedly recognized that the state
has “a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors,” and that “[t]his interest extends to shielding
minors from the influence of [material] that is not obscene by adult
standards,” but that is reasonably thought to be harmful to minors.344
At the same time, however, the Court has made clear that this
“interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of
speech addressed to adults.”345
How should the First Amendment apply in cases where the interests of both adults and children are involved? In some contexts
this problem poses little difficulty. For example, it is possible to
require identification for entry to adult bookstores and establishments, and in this way to effectively exclude most minors.346 In other
contexts, however, such as the Internet, it is not yet technologically
feasible to shield children from exposure to sexual material without
imposing some burdens on access by adults.347 In some recent cases,
the Court has shown an inclination to protect adult speech in this
situation.348 Treating laws intended to protect children as content-

341. Id. at 640.
342. Id. at 641–43 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-e (1965)).
343. Under the New York statute, material was deemed “harmful to minors” if it predominantly appealed to the prurient interest of minors, was “‘patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for
minors,’” and lacked “‘redeeming social importance for minors.’” Id. at 633 (quoting N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 484-h (1965)).
344. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (citations
omitted).
345. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997).
346. See id. at 887, 889 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting) (citing
Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 886 (1996)).
347. See id. at 856–57 (opinion of Court).
348. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (invalidating
provision of Telecommunications Act of 1996 requiring sexually explicit cable television
channels to fully scramble or block those channels, or to limit transmission to late-night hours
when children were unlikely to be viewing); Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (striking down Communications
Decency Act of 1996, Congress’s first effort to shield children from “indecent” and “patently
offensive” material on Internet). But cf. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (reversing a
decision holding that a subsequent statute enacted for this purpose, the Child Online Protection
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based restrictions on expression, the Court has subjected such laws to
“the most stringent review,” and has struck them down if they are
unable to meet the demanding requirements of strict scrutiny.349 In
my view, however, a more nuanced approach is called for. From a
rights-based perspective, the problem is one of reconciling competing
rights: the rights of adults to view pornography, on one hand, and the
rights of parents and the community to shield children from such
material, on the other. Resolving this problem calls for a careful
consideration of the nature and value of the rights on both sides, as
well as the alternative ways in which each interest could be satisfied.350
On this view, the Court in Reno v. ACLU351 was clearly justified
in striking down the Communications Decency Act, Congress’s first
effort to regulate Internet pornography, for the statute was far
broader than necessary to shield children from harmful material.352 It
does not necessarily follow, however, that all such efforts should be
held unconstitutional.353 Although adults should have a right to view
pornography, it is not unreasonable to require them to bear some
burdens to prevent that activity from resulting in harm to children—
for example, by paying the cost of placing such material behind
“identification screens” intended to exclude minors.354

Act, was unconstitutional, and remanding for consideration of a wide range of First Amendment issues).
349. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868.
350. See Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy, supra note 184, at 709.
351. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
352. For example, the statute’s prohibitions were not limited to material that would be
“harmful to minors” under Ginsberg v. New York, see supra note 343, and made no exception
for material with serious value. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 865, 877.
353. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 877 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (opinion of Dalzell, J.)
(three-judge court) (asserting that under the First Amendment “Congress may not regulate
indecency on the Internet at all”), aff’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
354. On remand from the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564
(2002), the Third Circuit recently reaffirmed its holding that Congress’s most recent attempt to
regulate Internet pornography, the Child Online Protection Act, is probably unconstitutional.
ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003) (upholding preliminary injunction). The issue is
likely to return to the Supreme Court. The Court also recently heard arguments in a case on the
constitutionality of the Children’s Internet Protection Act, which requires public libraries (and
public schools), as a condition of receiving federal subsidies, to use filtering software designed to
prevent “patrons from accessing ‘visual depictions’ that are ‘obscene,’ ‘child pornography,’ or in
the case of minors, ‘harmful to minors’” under Ginsberg. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc. v. United
States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407 (E.D. Pa.) (three-judge court), prob. juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 551
(2002).
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D. State Subsidies for Expression
In recent years, one of the sharpest disputes over free expression
has focused on the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA). The
conflict erupted in 1989 after it was learned that the NEA had provided funding for exhibitions of work by two controversial artists:
Andres Serrano, whose “Piss Christ” showed a crucifix submerged in
urine, and Robert Mapplethorpe, whose work included a series of
explicit photographs portraying homosexuality, sadomasochism, and
child nudity.355
The controversy came to a head the following year during a congressional debate over legislation reauthorizing the NEA. Turning
back efforts by the Endowment’s strongest opponents, Congress
rejected amendments that would have “zeroed out” the agency’s
budget or strictly limited the type of works that could receive funding.356 However, in a compromise between supporters and critics of
the NEA, Congress adopted language providing that, in awarding
grants, the agency should consider not only “artistic excellence and
artistic merit,” but also “general standards of decency and respect for
the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”357 A First
Amendment challenge to this provision was brought by Karen Finley
and several other performance artists.358
To decide the case, the Supreme Court had to confront a more
general question: how should the First Amendment apply in situations where the state acts not to regulate speech, but rather to subsidize or support it? Although the justices have struggled with this
issue for nearly two decades, they have never been able to satisfactorily resolve it.359 Instead, the Court has found itself torn between two
opposing positions, which I shall call the governmental power and
individual rights views. According to the former view, the Constitution imposes few if any limits on the state’s power to determine what

355. See NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 574 (1998).
356. See Steven J. Heyman, State-Supported Speech, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1119, 1176
[hereinafter Heyman, State-Supported Speech].
357. Arts, Humanities, and Museums Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, §
103(b)(1), 104 Stat. 1960, 1963 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1994)). The legislation further
instructed the NEA to make clear that works that meet the legal standard for obscenity are
“without artistic merit, [are] not protected speech, and shall not be funded.” Id. § 103(b)(2).
358. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 577–78.
359. For a critique of Court’s jurisprudence in this area, see Heyman, State-Supported
Speech, supra note 356, at 1122–42.
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expression to support.360 By contrast, the latter position holds that the
First Amendment applies to subsidy decisions in much the same way
that it applies to laws that restrict or penalize expression.361 Both
positions had forceful advocates in NEA v. Finley. On one side,
Justice Scalia contended that the NEA decency clause posed no First
Amendment issue at all, for there was a fundamental “distinction
between ‘abridging’ speech” and merely declining to fund it.362 On
the other side, Justice Souter argued that to deny funding for offensive art effectively “penalizes” such expression, in violation of the
First Amendment rule against viewpoint discrimination.363
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor attempted to steer a
middle course between these two positions. Emphasizing that the
decency clause did not forbid the NEA to fund indecent art, but
merely stated that decency ought to be taken into consideration,364
O’Connor found that there was no “realistic danger” that the clause
would lead to discrimination against any particular set of ideas.365
Accordingly, she declined to hold the statute unconstitutional on its
face.366 At the same time, she cautioned that the Court “would
confront a different case” if “the NEA were to leverage its power to
award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on
disfavored viewpoints.”367 Yet this nod to the individual-rights
position was soon followed by an appeal to the opposite view: “[I]n
the subsidy context,” O’Connor noted, “the Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at
stake.”368
In Finley, then, the majority sought to stake out a middle position in the arts funding debate: the government may consider decency
in awarding NEA grants, but does not have carte blanche to deny
funding to controversial art. To my mind, this position is an attractive
360. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Regan v. Taxation with Representation,
461 U.S. 540 (1983).
361. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Rust,
500 U.S. at 203 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
362. Finley, 524 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
363. Id. at 600–01, 606 (Souter, J., dissenting).
364. Id. at 580–81.
365. Id. at 583.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 587.
368. Id. at 587–88.

HEYMAN 6-17

2003]

6/17/03 3:55 PM

IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

615

one. Yet the majority was unable to articulate a persuasive rationale
for its position, or to formulate a coherent approach to the problem
of subsidized speech and the First Amendment.
How should we think about the problem? On one hand, denials
of funding cannot reasonably be equated with traditional censorship
or “affirmative suppression of speech.”369 Public programs such as the
NEA are established for public purposes; they involve an exercise of
our freedom as a community, in which we institute a program and
direct how its resources are to be used to promote the public good.
On the other hand, such programs do have an impact on individual
freedom of expression. For this reason, they must be subject to
constitutional constraints: under the First Amendment as well as
equal protection doctrine, the government cannot be permitted to
arbitrarily distribute opportunities to engage in expressive activities.
It follows that both the individual rights and the governmental power
views are inadequate. Instead, the problem of subsidized speech is
best understood as an issue of distributive justice in the modern
liberal state: the government should be required to distribute funds in
a fair and evenhanded way consistent with the purposes of the
program.
Under this approach, which I have developed in depth elsewhere,370 laws that prescribe standards for funding within a public
program should be reviewed under a form of intermediate scrutiny.
Such standards should be upheld if the following requirements are
satisfied. First, the criteria must be substantially related to the
purposes of the program. Second, those purposes must be constitutionally legitimate. Third, the criteria must treat the program’s
beneficiaries (and others) in a way that accords with constitutional
norms of respect for individual liberty and equality. Finally, the
program must not have the purpose or effect of undermining other
aspects of the constitutional order.371
How would the NEA decency clause fare under this approach?
To answer this question, we must consider the purposes that the
369. Id. at 601 (Souter, J., dissenting).
370. Heyman, State-Supported Speech, supra note 356.
371. This analysis, it should be noted, should apply only to laws or policies that seek only to
direct the way that funds should be used within a public program. By contrast, if applicants are
denied funding because of expression outside the scope of the program, the funding denial
should be treated in the same way as a restriction or penalty on expression. In the absence of
adequate justification, such action should be held invalid under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions.
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Endowment was intended to serve. If its only purpose was to promote artistic self-expression, the clause should be struck down, for
indecent art can be no less expressive than other art. As the 1965
debates over the NEA’s enabling act show, however, the Endowment
was created for several other purposes as well: to promote public
appreciation for the arts, and thereby afford citizens “‘new opportunities for self-improvement and fulfillment’”; to build and enhance a
common culture; and to “‘enrich . . . the core of human life’” by
“‘preserv[ing] and develop[ing] our human values.’”372 The adoption
of the decency clause in 1990 may be said to reflect a legislative
judgment that artistic works or performances that violate the community’s standards of decency or civility tend to detract from, rather than
to enhance, the common culture. Although this judgment is a profoundly controversial one, I do not believe that it is unreasonable. A
reviewing court should therefore find the decency clause to be
substantially related to the purposes of the NEA. Unless one is
willing to hold that these purposes are themselves illegitimate—in
which case the NEA itself would be unconstitutional—the second
requirement is also satisfied. Third, the decency clause does not
disrespect constitutional norms of individual liberty or equality. The
clause does not prevent individuals from making their own choices
about what art to create or view. Instead, it simply reflects a legislative judgment about which forms of artistic activity should receive
public support. Finally, because the NEA is responsible for a relatively small share of arts funding in the United States, it seems
unlikely that the agency will come to dominate American culture or
to undermine freedom of artistic expression within the private sphere.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court was right to sustain the facial
validity of the decency clause in NEA v. Finley.
More generally, while the rights-based theory holds that sexual
material may be regulated only to protect the rights of others, the
community should have a substantial degree of authority to determine what forms of expression should receive public support. At the
same time, this authority must be bounded by respect for individuals.
In particular, public programs may not distribute funds in a way that
discriminates between different speakers or forms of expression in a
way that is not justified in light of the program’s purposes, or in a way
372. Heyman, State-Supported Speech, supra note 356, at 1181–82 (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
618, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3186, 3190; 111 CONG. REC. 23,943,
23,948 (1965) (statements of Rep. Rivers and Rep. Moeller)).
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that conflicts with constitutional notions of liberty and equality. In
this way, the theory once more seeks to reconcile competing values,
the rights of individuals and those of the community.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the debate over pornography has been dominated by three perspectives: conservative, liberal, and radical feminist. Although each position has force, none fully captures our
intuitions on the subject. Instead, we should seek to reconcile these
conflicting perspectives within a more complex view. This function
can best be performed by a comprehensive theory of rights—a theory
that is broad enough to encompass the rights of individuals, groups,
and the community as a whole. Under this approach, individuals
should enjoy considerable freedom to make and view sexually oriented materials. But this protection should not extend to material
that invades the rights of others. In particular, I have argued that
violent pornography may be banned because it violates the rights of
women to personality, personal security, and equality, as well as the
most fundamental right of all—the right to recognition. In this
regard, violent pornography also infringes the rights of the community as a whole, by undermining the mutual recognition that constitutes the community. The community also should have the right to
exclude pornography from the public sphere, to shield children from
such material, and to decline to subsidize such material. Contrary to
the Supreme Court’s traditional doctrine, however, the community
should have no general power to ban material that it considers to be
obscene, for such a power is inconsistent with the autonomy of
individuals to determine the content of their own thought and expression.
In these ways, the rights-based theory seeks to recognize and incorporate the core values of each position: the liberal focus on
autonomy, the feminist demand for equality, and the conservative
concern for community. Of course, any particular effort to reconcile
these conflicting views is bound to be controversial. As I have
stressed, ideological disagreement is inevitable in this area, and no
theory can put an end to it. Instead, the aim of constitutional theory
should be to develop a common language within which we can
reasonably debate issues of this sort. In this respect, I believe that
rights theory has much to offer.
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In discussing the issue of pornography, this Essay has also explored the nature of constitutional interpretation. Contrary to the
accepted view, such interpretation does not involve the articulation
and development of a unitary, coherent set of principles. Instead, it
calls for an effort to reconcile opposing positions, and to incorporate
them into a more comprehensive view. In many ways, this dialectical
approach would transform the way we approach constitutional
theory. At the same time, it would bring such theory much closer to
the real world of legal and political argument, in which constitutional
meaning emerges from the clash of conflicting perspectives.

